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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
"Research is what I'm doing when I don't know
what I'm doing."
Wernher Von Braun (1912-1977)
The dawning of the information age revealed the necessity of information se-
curity by making many enemies like viruses, hackers, electronic eavesdropping and
electronic fraud. Sensitive information like financial transactions, health and legal
reports, credit ratings are transmitted over electronic medium which is open to public
use. This fact has heightened the awareness of the need to protect the confidentiality
and integrity and to guarantee the authenticity of the source and information.
To provide a secure environment where communication and electronic commerce
can be conducted without fear, we rely on the disciplines of cryptography and net-
work security. We need to implement the necessary cryptographic functions in very
efficient ways, keeping in mind that high performance and practicality are of utmost
importance. On servers that deal with hundreds of transactions each minute, time
spend in cryptographic functions can be critical for the availability of services.
In this thesis, we concentrate on developing high-speed algorithms which can be
used in a number of cryptographic systems. Specifically, we are focusing on ellip-
tic curve cryptosystems because of their high security with short key lengths. This
property has made the use of Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
very popular. ECDSA generates shorter signatures providing the same amount of se-
curity as other cryptosystems (RSA, ElGamal, etc.) with longer signatures. Elliptic
curve cryptosystems require space and time efficient implementations in arithmetic
operations conducted over finite fields.
We are proposing new methods for arithmetic operations over the finite fields
GF(p)andGF(pk).Since arithmetic operations in finite fields have applications in2
coding theory and computer algebra the proposed methods in this thesis might have
applications in those areas.
1.1Motivation
Arithmetic in finite fields is the base of many public-key algorithms, including the
Diffie-Heilman key exchange algorithm [7], elliptic curve cryptography [15, 24], and
the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [27]. The overall perfor-
mance of these cryptographic algorithms depend on the efficiency of the arithmetic
performed in the underlying finite field.
Specifically, the motivation of this research was to speed up the ECDSA signature
and verification time. The profiling data obtained from an ECDSA implementation
demonstrated that 85 % of the overall time was spend in modular multiplication,
addition and subtraction. Speedup in those routines is crucial to speedup the overall
signature time. We introduced the incomplete modular arithmetic concept which is
a practical and effective approach to speedup the ECDSA signature and verification
procedures.
We continued to work onGF(pk)arithmetic to produce a fast arithmetic ii-
brary to implement ECDSA. Previous work of Bailey and Paar exploits the fact that
software implementations ofGF(pc)have advantages overGF(p)for performing mul-
tiprecision arithmetic without carry propagation, and overGF(2c)for performing
word size calculations supported by the microprocessor. Bailey and Paar propose to
use special forms for p and the generator polynomial to construct the extension field
GF(pk)[2, 1]. This choice results in a dramatic tradeoff between the performance of
arithmetic in the extension field and the number of the extension fields available to
use. Most of the research conducted in this subject has advanced on that direction.
Our motivation was to implement the finite field arithmetic without limiting the
the prime characteristic p and the generator polynomial and still obtain comparable
timing results to the arithmetic implemented by Bailey and Paar.3
1.2Thesis Outline
Chapter 2 provides a short background of cryptographic systems. The definitions of
private key cryptosystems and public key cryptosystems are given and their proper-
ties are explained. In addition, some of the well known public key cryptosystems are
explained.
In Chapter 3, an overview of elliptic curves and their properties that make it
possible to use them in cryptographic systems are given.
Chapter 4 explains the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA).
We are giving the algorithms to generate the private and public keys, generate the
digital signature and verify it.
In Chapter 5, we are focusing on finite field arithmetic inGF(p).The basic
arithmetic operations (i.e., addition, subtraction, and multiplication) in the finite
fieldGF(p)have several applications in cryptography, such as decipherment op-
eration of the RSA algorithm [28], the Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm [7],
elliptic curve cryptography [15, 24], and the Digital Signature Standard including
the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [27]. These applications
demand high-speed software implementations of the arithmetic operations inGF(p)
for 160 <log2(p) 2048. In Chapter 5, we introduce the incomplete modular
arithmetic concept and describe a new method for obtaining high-speed software im-
plementations of the arithmetic operations on the ARM microprocessor and general-
purpose computers.
In Chapter 6, we investigate to finite field arithmetic inGF(pk).We are propos-
ing two new methods for modular multiplication inGF(pc).The first method is
called the Double Montgomery Multiplication where we use the Montgomery multi-
plication algorithm both for the polynomial multiplication in the extension field and
the coefficient multiplications in the subfieldGF(p).We obtained fast timing results
using this method. The second method is an improvement over the Double Mont-
gomery Multiplication method. We are using the incomplete arithmetic concept
introduced in Chapter 5 to reduce the complexity for the subfield multiplicationsru
performed in GF(p). The second method provides us a 18-30 % speedup in the
ARM7TDMI microprocessor implementation and 46-69 % speedup in a Pentium II
processor implementation over the first method. Both methods have no restriction on
the generator polynomial except it is monic and irreducible as expected. In addition,
both algorithms restrict the prime p to have less bit-length than the word-length of
the microprocessor.
Chapter 7 explains the modular inversion operation in GF(pc).It gives sev-
eral inversion algorithms from different papers which are suitable to use with the
multiplication algorithms introduced in Chapter 6.5
CHAPTER 2
CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS
"The art of war teaches us to rely not on the
likelihood of the enemy's not coming, but on
our own readiness to receive him; not on the
chance of his not attacking, but rather of the
fact that we have made our position unassail-
able."
The Art of War, Sun Tzu
2.1Introduction
In the past, cryptography has been used to secure military and diplomatic com-
munications. Most governments exercise control over cryptographic devices if not
over cryptographic research. But the information age has brought urgent need of
cryptography into the private sector. Sensitive information such as financial trans-
actions, health and legal reports, commercial agreements are transmitted over public
communication mediums. This type of information needs to be protected from any
attack that endangers its confidentiality, integrity and authenticity. In general, cryp-
tographic systems have four basic services which can be expressed as:
Confidentiality: a service used to keep the content of information hidden from
unauthorized parties.
Authentication: a service related to identification.Authentication applies to
both identification and information itself. Parties entering into a communica-
tion should identify each other. Information exchanged over a channel should
be authenticated as to origin, data content, time sent, etc.
Data Integrity: a service which deals with unauthorized alteration of data. The
system should be capable of detecting manipulation in data by unauthorized
parties. Data can be manipulated by insertion, deletion and substitution.Non-repudiation: a service which prevents parties from denying previous com-
mitments and actions.This can be achieved by ensuring that the previous
transactions are nonrevocable so that they are legally binding.Neither the
sender nor the receiver of a message should be able to deny the transaction.
To achieve these goals two general methods were developed which were named as
private key cryptography and public key cryptography. In this thesis, we are working
on applications related to public key cryptography. But we willmake definitions for
both methods.
2.2Private Key Cryptography
The private key cryptography is also referred as the conventional encryption model.
This method was the only method used before public key cryptography was invented.
It is widely used due to the performance it provides when huge amount of information
is encrypted.
The original message referred to as plaintext is encrypted to a random, mean-
ingless message referred to as ciphertext by applying an algorithm that uses a key
independent from the plaintext. Different keys produce different ciphertexts. The
same key is used to decrypt cipertext to plaintext applying the decryption algorithm.
The below notation is giving a better idea how this method works.
Let M denote the set of all possible plaintext messages, C the set of all possible
ciphertext messages and K the set of all possible keys.
A private key cryptosystem consists of a family of pairs of functions
such that
Ek:M+Cand Dk:C+M keJ
Dk(Ek(m)) = m for all m E M and k E JC
Ek is the encryption function. Dk is the decryption function.If two or more
parties want to use this cryptographic system, they have to agree on one or more7
keys and solve the key distribution and key management problems. This can be a
serious problem if a secure medium to transmit the keys doesn't exist.
Another shortcoming of private key cryptology is its inability to support digital
signature schemes. A digital signature is an electronic analogue of a hand-written
signature that allows a receiver to convince a third party that the message is in fact
originated from the sender.
Classical examples to private key cryptography are the Playfair cipher, the Hill
cipher and rotor machines. Examples to modern techniques are the Data Encryption
standard (DES) and the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) which was announced
on February 2001 by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
2.3Public Key Cryptography
The invention of of public key cryptography in 1976 by W.Diffie and M.Hellman [7]
was a real breakthrough in the history of cryptography. W.Diffie and M.Hellman
were trying to find a method which could overcome the two major shortcomings of
private key cryptography which were inefficient and insecure key distribution and
inability to sign a digital message. They came up with a method that addressed
both problems.
The public key cryptosystem they proposed has keys come in inverse pairs and
each pair of keys has two properties:
Anything encrypted with one key can be decrypted with the other correspond-
ing key.
Given one of the keys, the public key, it is infeasible to discover the other key,
the secret key.
The encryption and decryption is separated which makes it possible to name one
of the keys as the public key and publish it. The following protocols explain how
public key cryptosystems work.
One can send a private message to someone by encrypting the message withthr receivers public key. Only the receiver can decrypt the message with his
secret key.
One can sign a message by encrypting it with his own secret key.Others
having access to to the specific public key can verify that the message was
encrypted with the corresponding secret key. No one else can forge a message
with the same property.
The first aspect simplifies the key management which was a serious problem in
large networks for the private key cryptography. The second aspect makes it possible
to sign and verify a digital message.
Diffie and Bellman introduced a key exchange protocol in their first publication
[7] along with their ideas of public key cryptography. Their protocol is known as
Diffie-Helirnan key exchange. And in terms of an arbitrary group it can be described
as:
1. (Setup) A and B publicly select a (multiplicatively written) finite group C and
an element aeG.
2. A generates a random integer a, computes aa in G, and transmits aa to B over
a public communications channel.
3. B generates a random integer b, computes ab in C, and transmits ab to A over
a public communications channel.
4. A receives ab and computes (a.
5. B receives aa and computes (a.
A and B now share the common group element aa). Note that an eavesdropper
knows G,a,aa and ab, and his task is to use this information to reconstruct at. This
problem is commonly referred to as Diffie-Heliman problem.
The problem of computing a, given G, a and aa is called the discrete logarithm
problem.It has not been proven but widely believed that the discrete logarithm
problem and the Diffie-Heilman problem are computationally equivalent [24].2.3.1Trapdoor Knapsacks
Later in the same year of 1976, Ralph Merkie began to work on his best-known
contribution to public key cryptography. He build trapdoors into the knapsack one-
way function to develop the trapdoor knapsack public key cryptosystem. Given a
cargo vector of integers a = (ai,a2, ...,a) it is easy to add together the elements
of a specified subvector.It is not easy to figure out a subvector given a sum S
of some of the elements of the cargo vector. This problem is known to be a NP-
complete problem. The cargo vector a can be used to encrypt an n-bit message
x =(x1, x2,...,x) by applying the dot product S = a x, where S is the ciphertext.
Merkie choose the cargo vector a such that each element is larger than the sum
of the preceding elements which is called superincreasing. We name this vector as
a'. It is easy to find out the message x if a' and 5' are given and 5' = a' x holds.
Therefore a random superincreasing vector a' with hundreds of components is chosen
and kept secret. We further need a random integermwhich should be larger than
a' and a random integer w, relatively prime tom.The inversew1modm isused
in decryption.
m.
The cargo vector a is obtained by multiplying each component of a' by w mod
Alice's public key is a permuted version of a.She keps the permutation, the
simple cargo vector a',w,w' and the modulusmsecret as her private key. If Bob
wants to send a message x to Alice, he computes S = a x and sends S.
5' = w' Smod m
= a2 x2mod m
=w1>(w amod m) x2mod m
=(w'w amod m) x2mod m
= a x2mod m
= a'x10
When m >a, Alice can use her secret informationw1mod m to transform
any message S to S' and solve S' = a' x for xwhich is easy to compute.
In 1982 the single iteration knapsack cryptosystem was first broken by Adi
Shamir and others followed. Two years later multi iteration knapsack cryptosys-
tems were broken which was the end of the knapsack systems.
2.3.2RSA Cryptosystem
The RSA cryptosystem was invented in 1977 by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [29]
and was the first realization of Diffie-Hellman's abstract model for public key cryp-
tography. The security of the RSA cryptosystem rests on the integer factorization
problem. The key generation, encryption and decryption methods of the RSA algo-
rithm are give as below.
Figure 2.1. RSA Algorithm
KEY GENERATION
Select p, q
Calculate n = p x q
Calculate q(n)=(p1)(q1)
Select integer e
Calculate d
Public Key
Private Key
ENCRYPTION
p and q both prime
gcd(q(n),e) = 1;1 <e < çb(n)
d =e1mod b(n)
{e,n}
{d,n}
Plaintext M <n
Ciphertext C = M (mod n)
DECRYPTION
Plaintext C
Ciphertext M = Cd (mod n)11
2.3.3ElGamal Cryptosystem
In 1985, T. ElGamal [9] proposed a public key scheme based on the discrete logarithm
problem. The scheme is given in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2. ElGamal Public Key Encryption
KEY GENERATION
. Generate p
. Generate a
Select random integer a
Compute aamod p
Public Key
Private Key
ENCRYPTION
a large random prime
a generator of the multiplicative
group G of integers modulo p
1a<p-2
(p, a, aa)
Obtain the receivers authentic public key(p, a, aa)
Represent message as integerm 0 < m <p 1
Select random integerk 1 < k <p2
Computeamod p
Compute 5m(aa)kmod p
Send the ciphertext c = ('y, 5) to receiver
DECRYPTION
Compute'y1mod p 7p1c =
Recovermbym(ny_a)mod
The problem of breaking the ElGamal encryption scheme, i.e., recoveringmgiven
p, a, aa, 7 and 6, is equivalent to solving the Diffie-Hellman problem.The ElGamal
encryption scheme can be viewed as comprising a Diffie-Heliman key exchange to
determine a session key a', and then encrypting the message multiplying with the
session key. ElGamal [9] also designed a signature scheme, which makes use of the12
group G [241.It is critical that different random integerskare used to encrypt
different messages. If the samekis used to encrypt two messagesm1andrn2and
the resulting ciphertext pairs are ('yi,6)and('y2, 62),then61/82=mi/rn2. rn2could
be computed ifm1were known.
2.3.4Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems
Elliptic curves have been studied by mathematicians for more than a century. Besides
their recent cryptographic applications they are used in primality testing and integer
factorization. Elliptic curves were first suggested in 1985 independently by N. Koblitz
[15] and V. Miller [25] for implementing public key cryptosystems. The majority of
the products and standards that use public key cryptography for encryption and
digital signatures use RSA. But the bit length for secure RSA use has increased over
recent years, and this has increased the processing load on applications using RSA.
Recently, the Elliptic Curve Cryptology (ECC) has begun to challenge RSA.
The security of ECC rests on the discrete logarithm problem over the points of
an elliptic curve. When the curve is defined over a finite field the points of the curve
form an abelian group. The addition of the points can be implemented efficiently
both in software and hardware.
As it is in the case with the integer factorization problem and the discrete log-
arithm problem modulo p, no efficient algorithm is known to solve the elliptic curve
discrete logarithm problem. Of the three problems, the integer factorization and
the discrete logarithm problem modulo p both admit general algorithms that run
in sub-exponential time. This means the problem is still hard, but not as hard as
those problems that admit only fully exponential algorithms. The best general al-
gorithm for the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem is fully exponential time.
Therefore, cryptosystems that rely on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem
provide higher strength-per-bit than the other cryptosystems that rely on the integer
factorization problem and the discrete logarithm problem modulo p.
Having shorter key lengths mean smaller bandwidth and memory requirements,13
which is a crucial factor in some applications such as design of smart cards, where
both memory and processing power are limited.Another advantage of using the
elliptic curves is that each user may select a different curve, even though the under-
lying field is the same for all. That means each user can change his curve periodically
(for extra security) without changing the hardware [24].14
CHAPTER 3
ELLIPTIC CURVES
"Iaskedmy mother[amathematician]
whether mathematics was a difficult topic. She
said to be sure to learn all the formulas and
be sure you know them. The second thing to
remember is if you need more than five lines
to prove something, then you're on the wrong
track."
Edsger W. Dijkstra
3.1Introduction
After elliptic curves cryptosystems were invented by Neal Koblitz [15] and Victor
Miller [25] they became one of the most popular cryptosystems due to the difficulty
of the mathematical problem their security relies on. The elliptic curve discrete
logarithm problem (ECDLP) appears to be harder than the integer factoring and
discrete logarithm problem [24]. Therefore the strength-per-key-bit is substantially
greater than the cryptosystems relying on the integer factoring and discrete logarithm
problem. The advantages gained from smaller parameters are speed and smaller keys.
These are important in environments where processing power, storage space or power
consumption is constrained. In this chapter we will give an overview of elliptic curves
and how they are used in cryptographic systems.
3.2Definition
For cryptographic purposes we are only interested in elliptic curves defined over finite
fields. An elliptic curve E over a field Fq, where q and p is a prime greater than
3, is the group formed by 0 and the solutions inFqto
y2=x3+ax+b (3.1)15
for a, bEFq such that=16(4a3+27b2) is non-zero. 0 is a special point, called the
point of infinity.Lis called the discriminant and equals to zero if f(x)=x3 + ax + b
has a double root. We say that E of equation y2=x3 + ax + b is non-singular if
LO.
3.3Addition Formula
There is a rule for adding two points on an elliptic curve E(Fq) to obtain a third
point on the curve which forms an abelian group with the identity element 0. Using
this group we can construct elliptic curve cryptosystems.
The addition rule is best explained geometrically as follows. Let P=(xi, y')
andQ =(x2,Y2)be two distinct points on an elliptic curve E. Then the sum of P
and Q is found by drawing a line through P and Q which intersects the curve at a
third point. The result R is the reflection of this third point in the x-axis.
If we need to add a point P=(xi, yi) to itself we need to draw the tangent line
to the elliptic curve point which intersects the curve at a third point. The result is
the reflection of this third point in the x-axis. The addition rules for all P,Q EE
can be summarized as follows:
1. 0+P P and P+0= P.
2.0=0.
3. IfP= (xi,yi)0, then P= (xi,-yi).
4. If P= -Qthen P+ Q=0.
5. If P0,Q0,QP, then the addition formulas for affine coordinates are
given as follows [11].
Let P=(xi,yi),Q =(x2,y2) and R=P+Q=(x3,y3) be points on elliptic curve
E(Fq).
. EC addition formulas when (P
x1
=.\(xix3)Yiwhere
A
Y2Yi
x2 x1
. EC doubling formulas when (P = Q)
Let P =(x1,y1)a point on the curve. Then, 2(xi,yi) = (x2,y2), where
x2 = A 2x1
Y2= A(xi x2)Yi
where
A
3x + a
3.4Group Structure
16
There areq2pairs (x, y) EFq XFq. Exactly half of the elements of F are squares.
There can be at most q/2 different y coordinates for the elliptic curve E :y2 =
x3 + ax+ b. For each y there could be two different x coordinates that satisfying the
equation. Then we should expect that the elliptic curve E will have approximately
q elements in E(Fq). The following theorem of H.Hasse shows that our expectation
is correct. The theorems stated in this chapter can be found in[33,24].
Theorem 3.1 (Hasse) Let E be an elliptic curve defined over Fq. Let #E(Fq) be
the number of points of E(Fq), including the single point of infinity. Then
The number of points of an elliptic curve can be computed with Schoof's algo-
rithm[31].The following theorem gives us a helpful result on the group structure of
elliptic curves.
Theorem 3.2 (Cassells) Let E be an elliptic curve defined over Fq.The group
structure of E is either cyclic or is the productoftwo cyclic groups. Furthermoreif
it is not cyclic, then the group structure is Z/mZZ/nZ, with mmand m(q1).17
3.5Counting Elliptic Curves
We want to use the elliptic curves for cryptographic applications.Therefore, we
should have a notion of how many elliptic curves there are for a field Fq.The
straightforward guess is that there are q choices for each of a and bin equation (3.1).
But some of these will produce singular curves and there are different equations
which can represent the same elliptic curve. The following theorems will clarify the
number of elliptic curves for a given field.
Theorem 3.3 Let q be such that the finite field Fq is of characteristic greater than
3. Then there areq2q distinct elliptic curves defined over Fq.
3.6Isomorphisms of Elliptic Curves
Two elliptic curves are isomorphic if there is a 1-1 and onto map between them that
can be given locally by rational functions. The following is a precisedefinition.
Definition 3.1 LetE : y2 = x3 +ax + b andE' : y2 = x3 +a'x + b' to be two elliptic
curves defined over the field F. We say thatE isisomorphic toE'over F if there
is some uEF* such that a' = u4a and b' = u6b. We denote this byE E'.We call
the set of all elliptic curves isomorphic to a fixedEits isomorphism class.
Definition 3.2 The j-invariant of an elliptic curveE :y2 = x3 +ax + b is the
quantity
j(E) = 1728 (4a)3//..
Theorem 3.4If Eand E' are isomorphic elliptic curves, thenj(E) = j(E').
It is interesting that the j-invariant comes close to determining the isomorphism
class ofE.
Theorem 3.5 IfEandE'are defined over some field F andj(E) = j(E'),thenE
andE'are isomorphic over the algebraic closure ofof F.iI]
Theorem 3.6 Let jo be a value in a field F. Then there exists an elliptic curve E
defined over F such that j(E) =j0.
To develop a notion of maps from an elliptic curve to itself we can focus on
isomorphism classes over Fq.
Definition 3.3 Let E: y2 = x3 +ax + b.Then u E F* defines an automorphism
from E to itselfifa = u4a and b = u6b. We denote the set of all automorphisms of
E by Aut(E).
Theorem 3.7 Let q be such that the finite fieldFq isof characteristic greater than
3. Let E be an elliptic curve defined over Fq. Then the number of automorphisms of
Eis
4if j(E) = 1728 and 4 divides q1;
#Aut(E) =6if j(E) = 0 and 3 divides q1;
2otherwise.
Theorem 3.8 (Waterhouse) Let q be such that the finite fieldFq is ofcharacter-
istic greater than 3. Then the number of isomorphism classes of elliptic curves over
Fqis
2q+6ifq1mod12;
2q+2ifq5mod12;
2q+4ifq7mod12;
2qifq11 mod 12.
The following proof is a simplified version given by A.J.Menezes and was taken
from lecture notes of Thomas A. Schmidt from the Oregon State University. By
Theorem (3.3) there areq2q distinct elliptic curves defined over Fq. This means
the sum of elliptic curves within distinct isomorphism clases must equalq2q.
If there were no automorphisms there would be q1 curves in the isomorphism
classes, because we would simply find all a' = u4a and b' = u6b. But actually, there19
are(ql)/#Aut(E)curves in the isomorphism class. The following equation is
summing over the isomorphism classes.
(q1)/#Aut(E) = q2q (3.2)
isom.class rep E
Canceling the factorq 1we get,
l/#Aut(E) = q. (3.3)
isom.class rep E
If all of the#Aut(E)are equal to2,then the number of classes would become
N = 2q.This is true when neither3nor 4 dividesq 1(Theorem(3.7)).That is
whenq mod 12according to Theorem(3.8).
Ifj 0,then a = 0. There areq 1choices forb EF. All of these curves
will have the same order of the automorphism group.If there is an isomorphism
class with an automorphism group of order 4, then there will be(q1)/4 such
classes. Similarly, ifj 1728,thenb= 0. If there is an isomorphism class with an
automorphism group of order 6, then there will be(q1)/6 such classes.
Suppose that3dividesq 1,but 4 does not. Then equation(3.3)becomes
6 (1/6) +(N6) .(1/2) = q.Solving this we findN = 2q +4. This is the case of
q7 mod 12.The remaining cases can be treated similarly.
3.7Implementation of Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems
3.7.1ECC Arithmetic Using Projective Coordinates
The addition operation of affine coordinates requires a field inversion which is very
expensive compared to field multiplication. This inverse operation can be eliminated
by using projective coordinates. In [5] different coordinate systems are explained and
compared regarding speed and memory requirements. The projective coordinates
are expressed as X, Y, and Z. We will give the addition and doubling formulas
forGF(p),the formulas forGF(pc)are very similar and given in[22].Converting20
affine coordinates to projective coordinates in trivial. The affine coordinate (x, y)
is converted as (X=x, Y=y, Z1). Converting projective coordinates to affine
coordinates requires the following computations.
x
x= , (3.4)
Y
y= (3.5)
The addition formulas are given as follows [10, 11].Let P=(X1, Y1, Z1),
Q =(X, Y2, Z2) and K=P +Q =(X3, Y3, Z3) be points on elliptic curve E(F).
. EC projective point addition formulas when (P
where
X3=vA
=u(v2X1Z2A)v3Y1Z2
=v3ZiZ
u=Y2Z1Y1Z2
V=X2Z1X1Z2
A=u2Z1Z2v32v2X1Z2
. EC projeetive point doubling formulas when (P=
Let P=(X1, Y1, Z1) be a point on the curve. Then, 2P=(X2, Y2, Z2).
X3=2hs
Y3=w(4Bh)- 8Y2s2
=8s3where
w=aZ?+3X?
s=Y1Z1
B=X1Y1
h=w2-8B
21
Point addition for projective coordinates requires 12 multiplications, 2 squarings
and doubling requires 7 multiplications, 5 squarings.
In the case of a = p3 the number of multiplications can be reduced [11].
3.7.2 ECC Arithmetic Using Modified Jacobian Coordinates
If we want to continue to make trade-offs between memory and speed we can use the
modified Jacobian coordinates which require one more coordinate but have a faster
point doubling equations than the projective coordinates [5].In section 3.5.3 we
explain elliptic scalar multiplication algorithms. These algorithms show that point
doubling is used far more than point addition. Again, we will give the addition and
doubling formulas for GF(p). Converting affine coordinates to modified Jacobian
coordinates is trivial as in projective coordinates. The affine coordinates (x, y) are
converted as (Xx, Y = y, Z = 1, W = a). Converting Jacobian coordinates to
affine coordinates requires the following computations.
x x = , (3.6)
y
(3.7)
The new elliptic curve equation becomes the following
X3+aXZ4+bZ6 (3.8)22
The modified Jacobian coordinates provide the fastest possible doublings. The
addition formulas for both Jacobian and modified Jacobian coordinates are given in
[5].
LetP=(X1,Y1,Zi,W1),Q_(X2,Y2,Z2,W2)andK=P+Q=(X3,Y3,Z3,W3)
be points on elliptic curve E(F).
. EC Jacobian point addition formulas when (P±Q) [5]:
where
X3 =H 2U1H2 + r2
=S1H3 + r(U1H2X3)
= Z1ZH
W3=aZ
U1= X1Z
s1=Y1z
U2 =
s2=Y2z3
H=U1U2
. EC Jacobian point doubling formulas when (P = Q)
where
X3=T
Y3=M(ST)U
=2Y1Z1
W3= 2U(aZ)
S = 4X1Y23
U=8Y14
M = 3X + (aZ')
T=-2S+M2
Point addition for modified Jacobian coordinates requires 13 multiplications, 6
squarings and point doubling requires 4 multiplications, 4 squarings.
3.7.3Elliptic Scalar Multiplication
The elliptic scalar multiplication is expressed asnP,wheren isa integer and P is
an elliptic curve point. BynP,we mean adding point P to itselfntimes. Scalar
multiplication can be performed efficiently by using the signed digit representation
as outlined below [11].
Elliptic Scalar Multiplication Algorithm
Input: Integernand an elliptic curve point P.
Output: Elliptic curve point S= nP.
Step 1.If it= 0 then output 0 and stop.
Step 2.Ifn <0the setQ=(P) andk=(n),else setQ=Pandkn.
Step 3. Leth1h1_1...h1h0be the binary representationof3k,
where the most significant bith1is 1.
Step 4. Letk1k11...k1k0be the binary representationof k.
Step 5. Set SQ.
Step 6. For i from 11 downto 1 do
Step 7.Set S = 2S.
Step 8. If h = 1andk = 0then compute SS + Q
Step 9. If h= 0 andk = 1then compute S = SQ
Step 10. Output S.
Another implementation that doesn't require much memory and brings some
speed up by reducing the number of point additions is the m-ary method [17]. The24
m-ary method can be generalized by scanning the bits of the scalarn, r =log2rn bits
at a time. The number m is chosen as a power of 2 to make the scanning simple.
M-ary Elliptic Scalar Multiplication Algorithm
Input: Integernand an elliptic curve point P.
Output: Elliptic curve point Q= nP.
Step 1. Compute and store wP for all w = 2, 3, 4,..., m1.
Step 2. Decompose ii into r-bit wordsffor i = 0, 1, 2,..., s1.
Step 3. Q=f5_1P
Step 4. For i from s2 downto 0 do
Step 5. Set Q2rQ.
Step 6. Iff0 then compute Q =Q + fP
Step 7. OutputQ.
There are several modifications that improve the performance of these algo-
rithms. Various sliding windows techniques can be found in [17].
To speed-up the elliptic scalar multiplication precomputation methods are used
[3, 23]. These methods try to eliminate doublings by using table lookup methods
where elliptic curve points are stored in tables. In [23] the section 14.6.3 explains
algorithms that use precomputation methods.25
CHAPTER 4
THE ELLIPTIC CURVE DIGITAL SIGNATURE
ALGORITHM (ECDSA)
"There are two ways of constructing a soft-
ware design; one way is to make it so simple
that there are obviously no deficiencies, and
the other way is to make it so complicated
that there are no obvious deficiencies. The first
method is far more difficult."
C. A. R. Hoare
4.1Introduction
The Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) was specified in a U.S. Government Federal
Information Processing Standard (FIPS) called as the Digital Signature Standard
(DSS). DSA's security relies on the discrete logarithm problem in the prime-order
subgroups of Z. The ECDSA is the elliptic curve analogue of DSA. ECDSA was
proposed by Scott Vanstone [34] in 1992. It was accepted in 1998 as an ISO (Inter-
national Standards Organization) standard, accepted in 1999 as an ANSI (American
National Standards Institute) standard (ANSI X9.62), and accepted in 2000 as an
IEEE standard (IEEE 1363-2000) and FIPS standard (FIPS 186-2).
Digital signature schemes are designed to provide the same functions of hand-
written signatures for the digital environment. A digital signature is a number that
is calculated from a secret known only by the signer and from the contents of the
message that is signed. The signature should be verifiable by other parties without
having any knowledge of the secret key. The signature generated should be unforge-
able to prevent the signer from repudiating a signature he/she created and others
from claiming that the signature is his/her signature.
The digital signature schemes can provide data integrity, data origin authenti-
cation and non-repudiation, but not used to provide confidentiality.4.2Domain Parameters
The domain parameters for ECDSA consists of a finite fieldFqof characteristic p, a
suitable elliptic curveEdefined over Fq, and a base point PeE(Fq). The following
is a detailed list of the domain parameters.
1. field sizeq,whereq = p,an odd prime, orq
2. the field representation type for the elements ofFq
3. a, b EFqwhich define an elliptic curveEoverFq (y2=x3+ ax + b in case
p>3,y2+xy=x3+ax+bincasep=2).
4. xp and Yp EFqwhich define the P = (xp, yp) of prime order inE(Fq)called
the base point.
5. the ordernpf the point P,n>2160 andn>
6. the cofactorh = #E(Fq)/71
4.3Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
The key pares are associated with a particular set of EC domain parameters. One
must have the assurance that the domain parameters are valid before generating the
keys.
The following key generation primitive is used by each party to generate the
individual public and private key pairs [11, 27].
ECDSA Key Generation The user A follows these steps:
1. Select a random integerd e [1, n 1].
2. Compute Q= dx P.
3. The public and private keys of the user A are(E, P, n,Q) andd,respec-
tively.27
The other parties can check if the the public key is valid by;
1. Checking thatQ0.
2. Checking thatXQand yare properly represented elements ofFq.
3. Checking thatQis on the elliptic curve defined by a and b.
4. Checking that nQ = Q.
If any of these checks fail the public key Q is invalid, otherwiseQis valid. The
following procedure describes how to generate the signature.
ECDSA Signature Generation The user A signs the messagemusing the fol-
lowing steps.
1. Select a pseudorandom integer k E [1, n1].
2. Computek x P = (x1,y1)and r =x1modn.
Ifx1GF(2'), it is assumed thatx1is represented as a binary number.
If r = 0 then go to Step 1.
3. Compute k' mod n.
4. Compute s= k'(H(m) + dr) mod n.
HereH isthe secure hash algorithm SHA-1.
If s = 0 go to Step 1.
5. The signature for the messagem isthe pair of integers (r, s).
ECDSA Signature Verification The user B verifies A's signature (r, s) on the
message in by applying the following steps:
1. Verify that r and s are integers in the interval [1,n-lJ.
2. Compute csmod n andH(m).
3. Computeu1 = H(m) cmod n andu2= rc mod n.
4. Computeu1 >< P+u2x Q =(x0,y0)and v = xo modn.
5. Accept the signature if v = r.CHAPTER 5
INCOMPLETE MODULAR ARITHMETIC IN GF(p)
5.1Introduction
The basic arithmetic operations (i.e., addition, subtraction, and multiplication) in
the finite fieldGF(p)have several applications in cryptography, such as decipherment
operation of the RSA algorithm [28], the Diffie-Heilman key exchange algorithm [7],
elliptic curve cryptography [15, 24], and the Digital Signature Standard including
the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [27]. These applications
demand high-speed software implementations of the arithmetic operations inGF(p)
for 160 <[log2(p)] <2048. In this chapter, we describe a new method for obtaining
high-speed software implementations of the arithmetic operations on microproces-
sors and general-purpose computers. The most important feature of this method is
that it avoids bit-level operations which are slow on modern microprocessors. The
algorithms proposed in this chapter perform word-level operations, trading them off
for bit-level operations, and thus, resulting in much higher speeds. We provide the
timing results of our implementations on a Pentium II computer, supporting our
speedup claims.
5.2Representation of the Numbers
The arithmetic ofGF(p)is also called modular arithmetic where the modulus is p.
The elements of the field are the set of integers {0, 1,..., (p 1)}, and the arithmetic
functions (addition, subtraction, and multiplication) takes two input operands from
this set and produces the output which is also in this set. We are assuming that
the modulus p is a k-bit integer where k E [160, 2048]. A number in this range is29
represented as an array of words, where each word is of length w. Most software
implementations require that w = 32, however, w can be selected as 8 or 16 on 8-bit
or 16-bit microprocessors.
In order to create a scalable implementation, we are not placing any restrictions
on the prime p or its lengthk.The prime number does not need to be in any
special form, as some methods require, for example, the method in [6] requires that
p c. Furthermore, the length of the prime p does not need to be an integer
multiple of the wordsize of the computer. We have the following definitions:
k: The exact number of bits required to represent the prime modulus p, i.e.,
k = log2p].
w :The word-size of the representation (i.e., the computer). Usually, w =
8, 16, 32.
s: The exact number of words required to represent the prime modulus p, i.e.,
11.
m : The total number of bits in s words, i.e., m= SW.
Since our computers are capable of performing only two's complement binary
arithmetic, we represent the numbers as unsigned binary numbers. A number from
the field GF(p) is represented as an s-word array of unsigned binary integers. We will
use the notation A =(A8_1A_2.. .A1Ao), where the words A for i = 0,1,...,(si)
are unsigned binary numbers of length w. The most significant word (MSW) of A is
A3_1, while the least significant word(LSW) of A is A0. The bit-level representation
of A is given as A =(ak_lak_2...aiao). Similarly, the most significant bit (MSB)
of A isakl,while the least significant bit (LSB) of A is a0. We will use exactly
s words to represent a number. Ifkis not an integer multiple of w, then we have
k = (s1)W +u where u<Wis a positive integer,and thus, only the least significant
u bits of the MSW ofA3_1are occupied, and the most significant(Wu) bits are
all zero.30
A8_1 A5_2 A A0
(8_i)
w U
a(3_1)_1 aW_ia,a_a
5.2.1Incompletely Reduced Numbers
This representation methodology has a shortcoming: it requires bit-level operations
on the MSW in order to perform arithmetic, which affects the speed of the operations
in software implementations. In order to overcome this shortcoming, we introduce
the concept of incomplete modular arithmetic. In order to explain the mechanics of
the method, we make the following definitions:
Completely Reduced Numbers: the numbers from 0 to (p1).
. Incompletely Reduced Numbers: the numbers from 0 to(2 1).
I={O,l,...,p1,p,p+l,...,(2ml)}.
. Unreduced Numbers: the numbers fromto(2 1)
U={p,p+1,...,(2tm-1)}.
Note that we have the following relationship between these sets:
Ccl
UcI
U=IC
If AeC and 2p <2k,then A has an incompletely reduced equivalentB E I
such that A= B(mod p).Thus, instead of working with A, we can also work
withBin our arithmetic operations. The incompletely reduced numbers completely
occupy s words as follows:31
B8_1 B3_2 B B0
b8_1b_1,b(8_l)_l b,,b_1 b0
When we perform arithmetic with incompletely reduced numbers, we do not need
to perform bit-level operations on the MSW. All operations are word-level operations,
and checks for carry bits are performed on the word boundaries, not within the words.
Furthermore, we skip unnecessary reductions until the actual output is produced, in
which case, we make sure that it belongs to C. This representation yields high-speed
implementations of the arithmetic operations.
An incompletely reduced numberBcan be converted to its completely reduced
equivalent A by subtracting integer multiples of p from B as many times as necessary
(until it is less than p).
5.2.2Positive and Negative Numbers
The numbers in the range [O,p1] as defined are positive numbers. The implemen-
tation of the subtraction operation requires a method of representation for negative
numbers as well. We use the least positive residues which allow simultaneous rep-
resentation of the positive and negative numbers modulo p. In this representation,
the numbers are always left as positive, i.e., if the result of a subtraction operation
is a negative number, then it is converted back to positive by adding p to it.For
example, for p =7,the operation s =34is performed as s = 34 + 7 = 6.The
numbers from 0 to (p1)/2 can be interpreted as positive numbers modulo p, while
the numbers from (p1)/2 + 1 to p1 can be interpreted as negative numbers
modulo p. However, numbers are always kept as unsigned positive integers.
5.2.3A Representation Example
We take the prime modulus as p = 11 = (1011) and the word size as w =3.Thus,
we have Ic =4ands = [k/wi = [4/31 =2, which gives m = 2 .3 = 6.The32
completely reduced set of numbers is C = {O, 1, ...,9, 1O}, while the incompletely
reduced set contain the numbers ranging from 0 to(21) = (261) = 63 as
I = {O, 1,...,62, 63}. The incompletely reduced numbers occupy 2 words as A =
(A1A0) = (a5a4a3a2aiao). For example, the decimal number 44 is represented as
(101 100) in binary or (5 4) in octal.
An incompletely reduced equivalent of A is given asB= A+ip, whereB E[0,63]
and i is a positive integer. For example, if A = 5, then the incompletely reduced
equivalents of A are given as {5, 16, 27, 38, 49, 60}. The incompletely reduced repre-
sentation is a redundant representation: we use the notation = {5, 16, 27, 38, 49, 60}
to represent the residue class.We will show in the following sections that this re-
dundant representation provides more efficient arithmetic in GF(p).
5.3Modular Addition
Since we use the incompletely reduced numbers, our numbers are allowed to grow
as large as2m1.The incompletely reduced representation avoids unnecessary
reduction operations. We add the input operands as X := A+ B(mod p). If the
result does not exceed 2m, we do not perform reduction. This check is simple to
perform: since msw, we are only checking to see if there is a carry-out from the
MSW. We will use the uotation
(c,S) :=A+B+c (5.1)
to denote the word-level addition operation which adds the 1-word numbers A and
B and the 1-bit carry-in c, producing the outputs c and S, such that c is the 1-bit
carry-out and S is the 1-word sum. The addition algorithm is given below:33
Modular Addition Algorithm
Inputs: A = (A8_1AAo) andB = (B3_1 B1B0)
Auxilary:F = (F3_1FFo)
Output:X= (X3_1XiX0)
Stepi:c:=O
Step2:fori=Otos-1
Step3: (c,S):=Aj+B+c
Step 4:if c = 0 then return X= (S3_1SSo)
Step5:c:=0
Step6:fori=Otos-1
Step7: (c,T):=S2+F+c
Step 8: if c=0 then return X= (T8_1.TTo)
Step9:c:=0
SteplO:fori=Otos-1
Stepli: (c,U):=T+F+c
Step 12:return X= (U8_1UU0)
If the carry-out from the MSW is zero, the algorithm produces the correct result
in Step 4 as X = S = (S8_1SSo). If the carry-out is one, we first ignore the
carry-out and then correct the result. By ignoring the carry-out, we are essentially
performing the operation S := S2m. Since we need to perform modulo p arithmetic,
we are allowed only add or subtract integer multiples of p, therefore, we need to
correct the result as T := (S2)+ F,whereF = (F3_1 ..F1F0)is called the
correction factor foradditionand is defined as
F=2mIp, (5.2)
where I is largest possible integer which brings F to the range [1, p1], in other
words, I = [2m/p]. The number F is precomputed and saved. By performing the
operation T := (S2m)+ F, we essentially perform a modulo p reduction as
T:=(S-2m)+FS-2m+2m-1pSIp. (5.3)34
Thus, the result X=T will be correct as a modular number after Step 8. However,
there is a danger in performing the operation TS + F since this might also cause
a carry-out from the MSW. The input operands A and B are arbitrary numbers,
they can be as large as 2'1, which gives S=2m+12. By ignoring the carry
in Step 3, we obtain S=2 2.Therefore, T := S + F in Step 4 may exceed
2m, andwe need to correct the result one more time, which is accomplished in Steps
9-11. This is the last correction we need to perform. There is no need for another
correction after Step 11, since the maximum value of U is strictly less than 2m
U=(T-2m)+F=2m-2-2m+F=-2+F-2+pl<2m. (5.4)
5.4Addition Examples
Letp=11,k=4,w=3,m=6,ands=2.WealsocomputeFas
F=2[2/]p =64 [26/11] 11=64-511=9. (5.5)
.We illustrate the addition of4 ={4, 15, 26, 37, 48, 59} and={5, 16, 27, 38, 49, 60}
and using the incompletely reduced numbers 26 and 27.
S=26+27
=53 (c =0 return Step 4)
The result is indeed correct since 53 is equivalent to 9={9, 20, 31, 42, 53}.
We give an addition example where the first correction (Steps 5-8) would be re-
quired. The addition of 4={4, 15, 26, 37, 48, 59} and={5, 16, 27, 38,49, 60}
and using the incompletely reduced numbers 37 and 49 is such an example.
S =37+49
=86 (c=1 Step 4)
=8664(ignore carry Step 4)
=22
T=22 + 9(correction Steps 5-7)
=31 (c =0 return Step 8)
The result is indeed correct since 31 is equivalent to= {9, 20, 31, 42, 53}.35
We give an addition example where the second correction (Steps 10 and 11)
would also be required. The addition of {6, 17, 28, 39, 50, 61} and=
{7, 18, 29, 40, 51, 62} using the incompletely reduced numbers 61 and 62 is such
an example.
S = 61+62
= 123 (c=1 Step 4)
= 12364(ignore carry Step 4)
=59
T = 59 + 9(correction Steps 5-7)
= 68 (c=1 Step 8)
= 6864(ignore carry Step 8)
=4
U = 4 + 9 (correction Steps 9-11)
= 13 (return Step 12)
The result is indeed correct since 13 is equivalent to= {2, 13, 24, 35, 46, 57}.
5.5Modular Subtraction
The subtraction is performed using two's complement arithmetic. The input operands
are least positive residues represented using incompletely reduced representation. We
will use the notation
(b,S):=A2Bb (5.6)
to denote the word-level subtraction operation which subtracts the 1-word number
B,and the 1-bit borrow-inbfrom the 1-word number A, producing the outputs
which are the 1-word number S and the 1-bit borrow-outb.The field subtraction
algorithm for computing X =A B(mod p) is given below:36
Modular Subtraction Algorithm
Inputs: A= (A8_1AAo) andB = (B8_1BiBo)
Auxilary:C (G8_1GGo) andF = (F_1FFo)
Output:X= (X_1XiX0)
Stepi: b:=0
Step2:fori=Otos-1
Step 3: (b,S) := A2 B2 b
Step 4: ifb =0 then return X (S3_1SiS0)
Step5:c:=0
Step6:fori=Otos-1
Step 7: (c,T):=S2+G2+c
Step 8:if c = 0 then return X = (T8_1T1To)
Step9:c:=0
Step 10:for i = 0 to s 1
Stepli: (c,U2):=T+F2+c
Step 12:return X =(U_1UiU0)
Ifb = 0after Step 4, then the result is positive, and it is a properly reduced modular
number. Ifb = 1,then the result is negative, we obtain the two's complement result,
i.e., we essentially compute
S:=AB=A+2mB. (5.7)
The result S is in the range [0, 2m1], as required.However, it is incorrectly
reduced, i.e., 2m is added, and thus, we need to correct the result by adding G =
(G8_1GiGo) which is the correction factor for subtraction defined as
G=Jp-2m, (5.8)
where J is the smallest integer which brings C to the range [l,pl], i.e., J = [2mIp1
It is easily proven that the sum of the correction factors for addition and subtraction,
i.e., the sum ofFand G, is equal to p since
F+G=2m_Ip+Jp_2m=(J_I)p=(12rn/p]_L2rn/pj)p=p, (5.9)37
in other words, we have G= pForF = pC. The result S is corrected to obtain
T in Steps of 5-8. After the correction of S in Step 8, we obtain
T=S+G=A+2mB+Jp-2m=AB+Jp. (5.10)
Similar to the addition algorithm in Step 8, this correction might cause a carry from
the MSW, requiring another correction which we need to take care of usingF.This
is accomplished in Steps 9-11. There is no need for another correction after Step 12,
since the maxium value S(2 1) gives
U<(2m-1)+G-2m+F=-1+p<2m. (5.11)
5.6Subtraction Examples
Let p = 11, k = 4, w = 3, m = 6, and s = 2. We also compute G as
C=[2m/ - 2' = [26/1111164 = 6 1164 = 2. (5.12)
Since F + G= p, wecould have also obtained C using G= pF = 119 = 2.
. We illustrate the subtraction operation S5-7, where = {5, 16, 27, 38, 49, 60}
and= {7, 18, 29,40, 51, 62}, using the incompletely reduced equivalents 49
and 40.
S = 49-29
= 20 (b = 0 return Step 4)
The result is indeed correct since 20 is a incompletely reduced number repre-
sents the reduced number = {9, 20, 31, 42, 53} which is equal to 5-7 = 2 = 9
(mod 11).
. On the other hand, the same subtraction S 57 operation using theincompletely reduced equivalents 16 and 40 is performed as
S = 16-40
= 24 (b=1Step 4)
= 6424(two's complement Step 4)
I]
T = 40 + 2(correction Steps 5-8)
= 42 (c = 0 eturn Step 8)
The incompletely reduced number 42 is also the correct result since it represents
= {9, 20, 31, 42, 53}.
We now give an addition example where the second correction (Step 9-12)
would be required. The subtraction operation 5-6, where = {5, 16, 27, 38, 49, 60}
and= {6, 17, 28, 39, 50, 61}, using the incompletely reduced numbers 49 and
50 is such an example:
S = 49-50
= 1 (b=1Step 4)
= 64 1(two's complement Step 4)
=63
T = 63 + 2(correction Steps 5-8)
= 65 (c=1 Step 8)
= 6564(ignore carry Step 8)
=1
U = 1 + 9(correction Steps 9-11)
= 10 (return Step 12)
The result is indeed correct since 10 is equal to (-1) modulo 11.
5.7Montgomery Modular Multiplication
The modular multiplication operation multiplies the input operandsAandBand
reduces the product modulo p, i.e., it computesC := AB(mod p). The reduction39
operation often requires bit-level shift-subtract operations [17]. We are interested
in algorithms which requires word-level operations. Instead of the classical modular
multiplication operation, we prefer to use the Montgomery modular multiplication
[26] which computes
T := ABR'(mod p), (5.13)
where R is an integer with property gcd(R, p) = 1. The selection of R is very im-
portant since it determines the algorithmic details .and the speed of the Montgomery
multiplication. GenerallyRis selected as the smallest power of 2 which is larger than
p, i.e., R =2/c, wherek =flog2p1.Thus, we have 1 <p< R,however, 2p>R.Ifk
is not an integer multiple of the word-length w, this selection requires that we perfom
bit-level operations. Following the general premise of this chapter, we propose the
use of R2m, wherem = sw, in order to avoid performing bit-level operations.
In this case, 2m may be several times larger than p, as it was also the case for the
addition and subtraction algorithms presented in the previous sections.
We propose to use the Montgomery multiplication algorithm for incompletely
reduced numbers, which receives two numbersAandBin the range [0, 2m1], and
computes the result T which is also an incompletely reduced number in the range
[0, 21], given by (5.13). In the high-level view, the Montgomery multiplication
algorithm computes the result T using
T=
AB + p (ABp'modR)
where p'is defined using the multiplicative inverse R' (mod p) as
(5.14)
RR1 pp'= 1, (5.15)
and computed using the extended Euclidean algorithm. The algorithm receives the
inputsA, B e [0, R1] and computes the result T in (5.14). SinceA, B < R,the
result of the operation in (5.14) will have the maximum value
(R-1)(R-1)+p(R--1)(R-1)(R-1+p)<R-1+p. (5.16)
R RIn other words, T as computed by (5.14) exceedsRonly by an additive factor of p,
therefore, we need to perform only a single subtraction to bring it back to the range
[o,R 1].
The word-level description of the Montgomery multiplication involves a word-
level multiplication operation, which we denote as
(c,T3):_T3+AB+c, (5.17)
in which the new value ofT3and the new carry word c are computed using the old
value ofT3and also the 1-word operands A andB,and the old carry word c. Here,
all operands A,B, Tj, c E[0, 2°1], i.e., they are all 1-word numbers. Since we
have
(2W_i) + (2W_i). (2°_i) + (2W_i) = (2W_ 1)(2W+ 1) = 22t 1, (5.18)
the result of the operation in(5.17)is a 2-word number represented using the 1-word
numbers T and c.
The details of different Montgomery multiplication algorithms can be found in
[19].Here we describe an algorithm which computes T using the least significant
word of the number p' defined in(5.15).SinceR2', we can reduce the equation
(5.15)modulo 2W, and obtain
pp' = 1(mod 2's'). (5.19)
LetP0and Qo be the LSW of p and p', respectively. Then, Qo is the negative of the
multiplicative inverse of the LSW of p modulo2°,i.e.,
Qo =P1(mod 2k'). (5.20)
This i-word number can be computed very quickly using a variation of the extended
Euclidean algorithm given in[8].The Montgomery multiplication algorithm for
computing T =AB2m(mod p) using Qo is given below.41
Montgomery Modular Multiplication Algorithm
Inputs: A= (A8_1AiA0) and B= (B_1BBo)
Auxilary:Qo andp =(P5_1PP0)
Output:T= (T3_1TiTo)
Stepl:for j=Otos-1
Step2: T3:=0
Step3:fori=Otos-1
Step4: c:=0
Step5: forj=Otos-1
Step6: (c,Tj) :=T3+AB+c
Step7: T5:=c
Step 8: M:= T0Qo(mod 2W)
Step 9: c:= (T0 + MPo)/2w
Step 10: for j=1 to s 1
Step 11: (c,Tj_i) :=T3+MP3+c
Step 12: (c,T3_1) :=T3 +c
Step 13:if c=0 return T= (T3_1TT0)
Step 14: b := 0
Stepl5:forj=Otos-1
Step 16: (b,T) := P3 b
Step 17:return T= (T3_1 T1T0)
The explanations and proofs of the steps are given below:
In Steps 1 and 2, we clear the words of the result T to zero. The final result
T = AB2m (mod p) will be located in the s-word T at the end of the
computation.
The first part of the multiplication ioop (Steps 3-7) computes a partial product
T which is of length s + 1. For i = 0, this value is given as
T:=A0B.42
SinceA0 E[0, 2h] and B[0, 2m_h], this value of T is less than equal to
2m-12w-1 2(s+1)w-2
In Steps 8-12, we are reducing T modulo p in such a way that it is now of
length s words at the end of Step 12. This is accomplished using the following
substeps:
First, in Step 8, we multiply the LSW of T by Qo modulo 2W. Recall that
Qo is the LSW of p' or it is equal toP1(mod 2W). Thus, M (which
is a 1-word number) is given as
M :T0Qo =T0 (P1) =T0P' (mod 2W).
Then, in Step 9, we computeT0 + M . P0which is equal to
X:=To+M.Po:=To+(ToP1)Po.
Note that X is a 2-word number, however, the LSW of X is zero since
T0 + (T0P1)P0=0 (mod 2W).
Therefore, after the division by 2W in Step 9, we obtain the 1-word carry
c from the computationT0 + M . Po.
Then, in the remaining steps, i.e., in Steps 10-12, we are finishing the
computation of T+ M . P.Since the LSW of the result is zero, we are also
shifting the result by 1 word to the right (towards the least significant) in
order to obtain the s-word number given by Equation (5.14).
According to Equation (5.16), the result computed at the end of Step 12 can
exceedR1 by at most p, and thus, a single subtraction will bring it back to
the range [0,R1]. In Step 13, we check if the carry computed at the end of
Step 12 is 1, i.e., if T exceedsR1.If there is no carry, then we return the
result T in Step 13 as the final product.43
Otherwise, we perform a simple subtraction T := Tp in order to bring back
T to the range [0,R 1].The subtraction operation is accomplished in Steps
14-16, and the final product value is returned in Step 17.
Therefore, the Montgomery modular multiplication works even if the modulusR =
2"° is much larger than p, i.e., it need not be the smallest number of the form
2
which is larger than p. While there may be several correction steps needed in the
addition and subtraction operations, a single subtraction operation is sufficient for
computing the Montgomery product T =AB2_8u(mod p).
The complete Montgomery multiplication and the incomplete Montgomery mul-
tiplication algorithms differ only slightly from one another. Algorithmically, these
two algorithms are similar.Their main differences are in the way the input and
output operands are specified:
The radix R in the complete Montgomery multiplication algorithm is taken as
2k,while the incomplete Montgomery multiplication algorithm uses the value
2'°, therefore avoiding bit-level operations if k is not an integer multiple of w.
The complete Montgomery multiplication algorithm requires that input operands
be complete, i.e., numbers in the range [O,p1], while the incomplete Mont-
gomery multiplication algorithm requires that input operands be in the range
[0,2m11.
The complete Montgomery multiplication algorithm computes the final result
as a complete number, i.e., a number in the range [O,pl], while the incomplete
Montgomery multiplication algorithm computes the result in the range [0,2
11.
5.8Multiplication Examples
Letp=53,k=4,w=3,m=6,ands=2. Sincep=53=(110101)and
Po = (101) = 5, we compute Qo = P' (mod 2W) as
Qo=-51(mod8)=-5=3.Also, we have R2m = 26= 64. Here are two multiplication examples:
We illustrate the multiplication of= {5, 58} and= {7, 60} using the
incompletely reduced numbers 58 and 60. Taking A = 58 = (111 010) and
B60 = (111 100), we compute T = AB R'(mod p) as follows:
Step 3: i = 0
Step 4,5,6 and j = 0: (c,To) :=A0Bo = 24 = 8 = (001 000).
Step5,6andj=1: (c,Ti) :=Ao.B1+c=2.7+1=15=(001 111).
Step 7:T2c1. Therefore, we have T=(0O1 111 000)
Step 8: M=T0.Q0=0.3 (mod8)=0.
Step 9: c =(T0 + M .P0)/8 = (0 + 0 5)/8 = 0.
Step 10,11 andj = 1: (c,To) = T1+MP1+c = 7+06+0 = 7 = (000111).
Step 12:(c,Ti) T2 +c = 1 + 0 = 1 = (000 001). We now have
T = (001 111).
Step 3:i = 1
Step 4,5,6 andj=0: (c,To) :=To+A1B0=7+74=35=(100 011).
Step 5,6 andj = 1: (c,Ti) := T1+A1B1+c = 1+77+4 = 54 = (110 110).
Step 7:T2= c = 6. Therefore, we have T = (110 110 011).
Step8: M=T0.Q0=3.3 (mod8)=1.
Step 9: c= (T0+M.P0)/8= (3+1.5)/8= 1.
Step 10,11 and j = 1:(c,To) =T1 + M . P1 +c = 6 + 16 + 1 = 13 =
(001 101).
Step 12:(c,Ti) =T2 +c = 6 + 1 = 7 = (000 111). We now have
T = (111 101).
Step 13: since c = 0, the result T = (111 101) is returned.
The final result is T = (111 101) = 61 which is an incomplete number. The
complete equivalent of 61 is 8 which is equal to 5 . 7. 64_i(mod 53).45
We now illustrate the multiplication of= {8, 61} andi = {10, 63} using
the incompletely reduced numbers 61 and 63. Taking A = 61 = (111 101) and
B = 63 = (111 111), we compute T = A.B R1(mod p) below. In this
multiplication, the subtraction steps (Steps 14-17) are performed.
Step 3:i = 0
Step 4,5,6 and j= 0: (c,To) :=A0 B0 =5.7=35= (100 011).
Step 5,6andj=1: (c,Ti) :=Ao.Bi+c=5.7+4=39=(100111).
Step 7:T2 = c =4. Therefore, we have T=(100 111 011)
Step 8: M=T0.Q0=3.3(mod8)=1.
Step 9: c= (T0 + M .P0)/8=(3+15)/8= 1.
Step 10,11 and j= 1:(c,To)= T1 + M P1 + c =7+16+ 1 = 14 =
(001 110).
Step 12:(c,Ti)= T2 + c =4+ 1 =5=(000 101). We now have
T= (101 110).
Step 3:i = 1
Step 4,5,6andj=0: (c,To) :=To+AiB0=6+77=55= (110 111).
Step 5,6 andj=1: (c,Ti) := Ti+A1B1+c=5+77+6=60= (111 100).
Step 7:T2 = c =6. Therefore, we have T= (110 110 011).
Step8: M=T0.Q0=7.3(mod8)=5.
Step9: c=(T0+M.P0)/8=(7+55)/8=4.
Step10,11and j= 1: (c,To)= T1 + M P1 + c =4+56+4=38=
(100 110).
Step 12: (c,Ti)=T2+c=7+4=11=(001011).
Step 13: sincec= 1,we execute the subtraction steps below.
Step 14: b= 0.
Step 15,l6andj=0:(b,T0)=T0Pob=6-5-0=1=(000001).Step15,16andj =1: (b,T1) =T1 -P1-b= 3-6-0 = -3(mod 8) =
5(000 101).
Step 17: T = (101 001) = 41 is returned.
The final result is T = (101 001) = 41 which is a complete number. The final
result 41 is equal to 8 10 . 64_I(mod 53).
5.9Implementation Results and Conclusions
The incomplete addition, subtraction, and Montgomery multiplication algorithms
together with their complete counterparts have been implemented on a 450-MHz
Pentium II computer running Windows NT 4.0 operating system, with 256 megabytes
of memory. The code is written entirely in C. The timings of the complete and
incomplete routines are tabulated in Table 5.1 in microseconds.
Table 5.1. Incomplete and complete arithmetic timings in microseconds.
Addition Subtraction Multiplication
k CompleteIncomplete%CompleteIncomplete CompleteIncomplete%
161 1.85 1.11 40 1.43 1.10 23 4.80 4.58 5
176 1.90 1.11 42 1.38 1.10 20 4.74 4.57 4
192 2.00 1.26 37 1.38 1.04 25 4.79 4.62 4
193 1.98 1.23 38 1.47 1.20 18 6.36 6.17 3
208 2.14 1.22 43 1.46 1.19 18 6.40 6.13 4
224 2.03 1.28 37 1.45 1.16 20 6.35 6.17 3
225 2.20 1.30 41 1.58 1.29 18 8.06 7.73 4
240 2.23 1.32 41 1.53 1.27 17 8.03 7.74 4
256 2.31 1.52 34 1.53 1.27 17 8.02 7.76 347
The speedup in percentage is obtained by subtracting the incomplete timing
result from the complete timing result and then dividing it by the complete timing
result.Ascan be seen from Table 5.1, the incomplete addition is 34-43 % faster
than the complete addition for the range of k from 161 to 256. Similarly, the incom-
plete subtraction is 17-23 % faster than the complete subtraction. The reduction in
the speedup for the subtraction operation as compared to the addition operation is
mainly due to the fact that we have to perform more corrections than the addition
operation. On the other hand, we obtain only a small speedup (3-5 %) for the in-
complete Montgomery multiplication operation since the incomplete and complete
Montgomery multiplication algorithms differ only slightly.
Furthermore, we have also implemented theECDSA[27, 12] over the finite field
GF(p) in order to find our the performance impact of the incomplete arithmetic as
compared to the complete arithmetic. The timing resuls of theECDSAsignature
generation algorithm are given in Table 5.2 in milliseconds. TheseECDSAtimings
are obtained without using any precomputation. We executed theECDSAcode
several hundred times using two different random elliptic curve sets for bit lengths
as specified in Table 5.2. Furthermore, the addition, subtraction, and multiplication
timings shown in Table 5.1 are also obtained by running theECDSAcode and
measuring the timings of the arithmetic operations in that context.
The implementation results have shown that theECDSAalgorithm can be made
to execute 10-13 % faster using the incomplete modular arithmetic, which is very
significant. Coupled with some machine-level programming, theECDSAalgorithm
can be made significantly faster, as shown in the last column of Table 5.2.Table 5.2. ECDSA signature generation timings in milliseconds overGF(p).
C code oniy C+Assembly
kCompleteIncomplete% Incomplete
161 13.6 12.0 12 5.3
176 14.8 12.9 13 5.8
192 16.5 14.7 11 6.6
193 20.8 18.4 12 8.5
208 22.6 19.7 13 9.1
224 23.7 21.1 11 9.7
225 29.8 26.5 11 12.2
240 31.1 27.9 10 12.8
256 34.2 30.8 10 14.0
In this chapter, we presented a new methodology for speeding up arithmetic
operations, and shown that the new method provides up to 13 % speedup in the
execution of the ECDSA algorithm over the fieldGF(p)for the length of p in the
range 161 < k < 256. In this chapter, we applied the incomplete arithmetic only to
the modular addition, the modular subtraction, and the Montgomery multiplication
operations. A similar word-level methodology was described in [30] for the modular
inverse and Montgomery modular inverse operations. These algorithms are also of
type word-level, i.e., they avoid bit-level operation.CHAPTER 6
DOUBLE MONTGOMERY MULTIPLICATION IN GF(p')
6.1Introduction
Arithmetic in finite fields is the base of many public-key algorithms, including the
Diffie-Heilman key exchange algorithm[7],elliptic curve cryptography[25, 15],and
the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm[27].The overall performance of these
cryptographic algorithms depend on the efficiency of the arithmetic performed in the
underlying finite field.
Finite fields are represented with the notationGF(pc),where p is a prime andk
is a positive integer. We know that there exists a field for each prime p and integer
k [21].Many cryptographic algorithms are implemented for the following two cases:
p is a large prime number andkis equal to 1, represented with the notation
GF(p)
p is equal to2andkis positive number, represented with the notationGF(2k)
The case for some large p (an 8-bit, 16-bit or even larger prime) and some positive
integer k is also receiving attention, particularly, in the context of elliptic curve and
hyperelliptic curve cryptographic algorithms[25, 15, 16].The previous work of Bailey
and Paar exploits the fact that software implementations ofGF(p')have advantages
overGF(p)for performing multiprecision arithmetic without carry propagation, and
overGF(2')for performing word size calculations supported by the microprocessor
[1,2].They propose to use special forms for p and the generator polynomial to
construct the extension fieldGF(pc).This choice results in a dramatic tradeoff
between the performance of arithmetic in the extension field and the number of the50
extension fields available to use. Most of the research conducted in this subject has
advanced on that direction [22, 4].
We are proposing two new methods for modular multiplication inGF(pk). The
first method is called the Double Montgomery Multiplication where we use the Mont-
gomery multiplication algorithm both for the polynomial multiplication in the exten-
sion field and the coefficient multiplications in the subfield GF(p). We obtained fast
timing results using this method. The second method is an improvement over the
Double Montgomery Multiplication method. We are using the incompletely reduced
arithmetic concept introduced in the previous chapter to reduce the complexity for
the subfield multiplications performed in GF(p). The second method provides us a
46-69 % speedup over the first method on the 450-MHz Pentium II. Both methods
have no restriction on the generator polynomial except it is monic and irreducible as
expected. In addition, both algorithms restrict the prime p to have less bit-length
than the word-length of the microprocessor. We provide the timing results of our im-
plementations on a Pentium II and an ARM microprocessor, supporting our speedup
claims.
6.2Previous Work
To optimize the arithmetic in GF(pc), Bailey and Paar [1, 2] introduced the concept
of the Optimal Extension Fields. In the definition of the OEF, p is a pseudo-Mersenne
prime of the form 2 ±c for somelog2c < n, and k is chosen such that an irreducible
binomialXCw exist so as to construct the field. These special forms of both p and
the generator polynomial allow us to perform simple reduction steps in the extension
field and the subfield. Furthermore, two special types of OEFs were introduced: In
OEF Type I the pseudo-Mersenne prime was fixed as p = 2' ± 1, and in OEF Type
II the generator polynomial was fixed as 2 to perform even simpler reduction.
Lee, Kim, and Lee [20] suggested the use of binomials for polynomial reduction,
however, they do not seem to restrict the prime p. Their timing results are reported
for a special prime p = 216129 for the field GF(p).51
Lim and Hwang [22] placed a restriction on p to perform further optimizations on
OEFs. They proposed to choose p so that multiplication results of two p-bit numbers
can be accumulated many times without exceeding the computer's wordsize and
eliminating reductions. They also used a Karatsuba-variant multiplication method,
however, the timings of the Lim and Hwang implementation are better than those
of Bailey and Paar on similar microprocessors.
Chung, Sim and Lee [4] implemented the OEF approach on a microcontroller
with a DSP coprocessor support. A variant of the standard multiplication method
was used instead of the Karatsuba multiplication.
In this chapter, we are proposing to implement the finite field arithmetic without
limiting the prime characteristic p and the generator polynomial and still obtain
comparable timing results to the arithmetic implemented in OEFs. The algorithms
proposed in this chapter are more flexible, and provide scalable implementations of
the elliptic curve cryptography in software, by not putting any limitations on p,k,
the irreducible polynomial, and the sizes of these operands. The prime p is expected
to fit into the word of the computer, which can be 8, 16, or 32 bits.
6.3Polynomial Representation
The extension fieldGF(pc)can be constructed with a monic irreducible polynomial
of degreek,which we call the generator polynomial and represent as
f(x)=xk+ajxi, (6.1)
wherea E GF(p).The field elements inGF(pc)can be represented as
a(x) = ak_lxk_l + + a1x + a0 , (6.2)
where a2EGF(p).We choose p so that its bit-length is less than the word-length
of the computer, which is denoted by w. We can represent each coefficient with one
word (w bits), requiringkwords(kwbits) for a field element.
The addition and subtraction of two field elements inGF(pc) isperformed by
adding or subtracting the coefficients of like terms modulo p, which requires one52
subtraction of p if the sum is greater than p. However, there is no carry propagation
between these k digits. Multiplication is performed by computing c(x) =a(x)b(x)
modf(x),wherea(x), b(x)eGF(pk).The modular multiplication is the most
important operation because it consumes more time and it is frequently used.
6.4Double Montgomery Multiplication in GF(p'
The Montgomery multiplication concept is given inGF(p)[26, 19] andGF(2c) [18].
The timing results obtained are demonstrating that Montgomery multiplication is
efficient when arbitrary values of p and arbitrary generator polynomials are used.
Based on this fact, the Double Montgomery multiplication algorithm proposed in
this chapter uses the Montgomery multiplication method both in the extension field
and the subfield.
Instead of computinga(x)b(x)inGF(p'),we are proposing to computea(x).
b(x). R(x)'inGF(p'),wherea(x),b(x)eGF(pc)andR(x)is a special fixed
element inGF(p').The termsa(x)andb(x)are called the residue forms ofa(x)and
b(x)wherea(x) = a(x) R(x)modf(x)andb(x) = b(x) R(x)modf(x).We select
R(x) = XCin order to obtain fast software implementations. This selection ofR(x)
provides us with a nice form of residue arithmetic, which is demonstrated below.
The result of the Double Montgomery multiplication is obtained in the residue form.
We can demonstrate this as
= . .R(x)' mod 1(x)
= a(x) R(x) b(x) R(x) R(x)'mod f(x)
= a(x)b(x) R(x)modf(x)
= c(x). R(x)mod 1(x)
The extension field polynomial multiplication is very similar to theGF(2c)polyno-
mial multiplication which was explained in [18]. For the sake of completeness, we are
also explaining it here forGF(pc).The Montgomery multiplication method requires
thatR(x)andf(x)are relatively prime. This requirement always holds, due to the53
fact thatf(x)is irreducible inGF(pk)andR(x) < f(x).SinceR(x)andf(x)are
relatively prime, there exist two polynomialsR(x)1andf'(x)having the property
that
R(x)R(x)1f(x)f'(x)-1, (6.3)
whereR(x)1is the inverse ofR(x)modulo1(x).The values ofR(x)andf'(x)
can be calculated using the extended Euclidean algorithm [21]. The general Double
Montgomery algorithm inGF(pk)without exposing the subfield arithmetic inGF(p)
is given below.
DOUBLE MONTGOMERY MULTIPLICATION ALGORITHM
Inputs:a(x), b(x), R(x), f'(x)
Output: c(x) such that c(x) =a(x) . b(x) . R(x)1modf(x)
Step 1:t(x) := a(x)b(x)
Step 2:u(x) :=t(x)f'(x)modR(x)
Step 3:c(x) :=[t(x) + u(x) . f(x)]/R(x)
Step 4:return c(x)
We can prove the correctness of the above algorithm with similar calculations as in
[18]. The equation u(x) =t(x).f'(x)modR(x)implies that there exists a polynomial
K(x)overGF(p')such that
u(x) =t(x)f'(x) + K(x). R(x). (6.4)
We substitute Equation (6.4) into the equation for c(x), which is defined as Step 3
in the algorithm.
1 c(x) = [t(x) + u(x)f(x)]
R(x)
1
[t(x) + t(x)f'(x)f(x) + K(x)R(x)f(x)]
R(x)
Furthermore, we havef(x)f'(x) = R(x)R(x)11 according to Equation (6.3). We
substitute this into the equation for c(x), and obtain
1 c(x) = [t(x) + t(x)[R(x)R(x)'1] + K(x)R(x)f(x)]
R(x)54
R(x)
[t(x)R(x)R(x)' + K(x)R(x)f(x)]
=t(x)R(x)' + K(x)f(x)
=a(x)b(x)R(x)1modf(x)
The result proves the correctness of the given algorithm. Similar to theGF(2k)case,
the final subtraction step required in theGF(p)algorithm is not required in the
GF(p')algorithm. The degree of the polynomial c(x) computed by this algorithm is
less than or equal tok 1,which is less than the degree off(x).In Step3,we realize
that the degree of c(x) can be calculated from(t(x)/R(x)) = 2k2kk2or
(u(x)n(x)/R(x)) = k1 + kk = k 1,which proves the previous statement.
The algorithm involves a regular multiplication at Step 1, a moduloR(x)multi-
plication in Step2,and a regular multiplication followed by a division withR(x)in
Step3.SinceR(x) = XC,the reduction part of the modular multiplication and the
division operation can be performed very fast. The reduction step of the modular
multiplication is performed by ignoring the terms which have larger degrees than or
equal degree toxk.The division byR(x)is performed by shifting the polynomial to
the right bykterms. The computation off'(x)seems to be an overhead, but the
word-level algorithm requires only the calculation of the least significant wordf (x)
instead the wholef'(x) [8].
In order to implement the Double Montgomery Multiplication method on the
Intel Pentium II and ARM processors, we designed a word-level algorithm based
on the Coarsely Integrated Operand Scanning (CIOS) method given in [19] which
seems to be the fastest Montgomery multiplication method. The CIOS method is
integrating the multiplication and reduction steps by alternating between iterations
of the outer loops for multiplication and reduction. The alternative methods for the
Montgomery multiplication described in [19] could be preferable for different classes
of processors. The compilers for Pentium and ARM processors support32bit and
64 bit numbers. We are using the term word to refer to32bit numbers and the term
double-wordto refer to 64 bit numbers. The most significant part of a double-word
is calledhigh-wordwhile the least significant part is calledlow-word.55
Before introducing the word-level algorithm in detail, we will explain the mul-
tiplication performed in the subfield. A Montgomery multiplication operation is
performed for the multiplication of the coefficients in GF(p). We know that the
multiplication of two coefficients will produce a term that can reach the size of
a double-word. We are reducing this termmodulo p within one iteration using
the Montgomery reduction method. For this multiplication, we define r2W and
p = p mod2, wherew stands for the word-length of the computer, asdefined
previously. We can summarize this reduction as adding a multiple of p to the term
that generates a zero in the low-word of this summation and dividing by r. The
algorithm for the subfield multiplication is as follows.
SUBFIELD MONTGOMERY MULTIPLICATION ALGORITHM
Inputs: a, b, p,p'0, and r
Output:c such that c =a b.r1mod p
Stepi:T:=ab
Step 2: u := LW(T)p'0mod r
Step3:c:=HW(T+n-p)
Step4:ifc>=pthenc:=cp
Step 5:return c
Note that the computation of c is equivalent to c := [T + u p]/r and the term T is
a double-word. The high-word and low-word of adouble-word (dw) are addressed
with the keywords HW and LW followed by the term in parenthesis. Using the same
notation we are giving the word-level algorithm for the whole multiplication below.
WORD-LEVEL DOUBLE MONTGOMERY MULTIPLICATION ALGORITHM
Inputs:a(x) = (ak_i aiao), b(x)=(bk_i. bbo),
f(x)= (fk fifo), p'0,andf
Auxiliary± =(tk t1t0)
Output: c(x) =(ck_i cico)
Stepi:fori=Otokldo
Step2: forj=OtokldoStep 3: dwl=a1*b
Step 4: rn=LW(dwl)*p'0
Step 5: dw2=m*p
Step 6: dw3=HW(dwl) + HW(dw2) +tj + 1
Step 7: if p < dw3 then
Step 8: if (2p) <dw3 then t3=LW(dw32p)
Step 9: else t3LW(dw3p)
Step 10: else t3=LW(dw3)
Stepli: dw1=t0*f
Step 12: m=LW(dwl)*
Step 13: dw2=m*p
Step 14: dw3=HW(dwl) + HW(dw2) + 1
Step 15: if p < dw3 then ml=LW(dw3p)
Step 16: else ml=LW(dw3)
Step 17: forj0 to k1 do
Step 18: dwlml*
Step 19: rn=LW(dwl)*
Step2O: dw2=m*p
Step 21: dw3=HW(dwl) + HW(dw2) + tj1 + 1
Step 22: if p < dw3 then
Step 23: if (2p) <dw3 then t3=LW(dw32p)
Step 24: else t2LW(dw3p)
Step 25: else t3=LW(dw3)
Step26: fori=Otokldo
Step 27: = ti
Step 28: return c(x)
The word-level algorithm consists of an outer ioop, which scans through the
coefficients of one of the polynomials, and two inner loops for the partial multiplica-
tion and the reduction operations. The first inner ioop starts at Step 2 and finishes57
at Step 10.In Step 3 the coefficient a2is multiplied with all other coefficients of
polynomial b(x) through the ioop. The multiplication results, which are stored in
dwl, can be double-word size at most. We need to reduce this values to one-word
numbers. In Step 4 and Step 5 we are calculating the multiple of p which generates
a zero low-word when added to dwl.
In Step 6 we perform the addition of the terms dwl and the multiple of p. We
add only the high-words of these terms and the number one because we know that the
low-words will add up to zero producing a carry. Discarding the zero low-word also
means dividing by r, which is required in the algorithm. The termt3accumulates the
partial results, which is set to 0 initially. Within the first execution of the inner ioop
thet3terms are equal to zero due to the 0 initialization. Based on the Montgomery
multiplication algorithm we know that the sum of the two high-words and the number
one is smaller than 2p. Normally we subtract p if the sum is grater than p to reduce
the result. But we have to consider thet3terms for the future iterations of the inner
loop. They will be smaller than p due to the reduction steps in the inner loops. This
means the dw3 term in Step 6 can take a value between 0 and 3p2. In the rest
of this inner loop we are reducing the term dw3 modulo p by subtracting p or
depending to its value.
We realize that the coefficients need to be in residue form to calculate a result
that is also in residue form. At this point, we have a partial result that needs to
be divided byx sothat we can continue to accumulate the other partial results
without increasing the space requirements. This is done by adding a multiple of the
generator polynomial to the partial result that produces a zero at the last term. By
discarding this last term we divide by x. This is the polynomial level Montgomery
multiplication which we explained previously.
In Step 11 we are calculating the value needed to obtain the multiple of the
generator polynomial.fis calculated as=f'r2mod 2W The result stored
in dwl hasr3as a factor and reaches the size of a double-word. We need to reduce
it to a word size number to be able to use it within the second inner ioop for further
multiplications. From Step 12 to Step 16 the number in dwl is reduced and the!IJ
result is written into variable ml. This is similar what is done in the first inner
ioop, except we don't have any terms for accumulation. We note that the factorr3
is reducing tor2because of the Montgomery reduction applied within these steps.
The second inner loop starts at Step 17 and ends at Step25.It is very similar
to the first inner loop except the accumulation in Step21is done in such a way that
we divide the partial result by x. We are shifting the polynomial by one term to
the right by using thet1in Step21and writing the result tot3in Step24and25.
Thef+iterm in Step18is representing the coefficients of the generator polynomial.
These terms are not in residue form because other arithmetic functions like modular
addition have to use generator polynomial. This is the reason we left ther2factor
within the ml term which was calculated before entering the second inner ioop. The
outer ioop iteratesktimes producing a polynomial which has a degree ofk 1.
In Steps26through28we copy the result as output and finish the Double
Montgomery Multiplication algorithm. We can use the Double Montgomery Multi-
plication algorithm to calculate the residue form of a given polynomial inGF(pc).
First we should calculatex2kmodf(x)and multiply each coefficient withr2ifGF(p).
Multiplying with this polynomial will give us the other polynomial in residue form.
In order to calculate the complexity of the Double Montgomery Algorithm, we
are counting the number of multiplications, additions memory read-writes. Table6.1
demonstrates the steps and operation counts in detail.
Using double-word variables to store and retrieve numbers does not require ex-
tensive memory access cycles. The values they hold are temporary values which are
discarded within a couple of processor cycles. We considered storing and retrieving
to arrays as memory access and assumed the worst case situations for the if clauses.
The Double Montgomery multiplication method requires6k2 + 3kmultiplication,
8k2 + 3kaddition,4k2 + 3kread, and2k2 + kwrite operations.59
Table 6.1. The operation counts for DMM.
Mult Add Read Write
for i0 to k-i do -
for j0 to k-i do
dvi = a[i]*b[j] k2 k2+k
mLW(dvl)*pO' k2
dw2m*p k2 -
dv3HW(dwl)+HW(dv2)+t[jJ+i - 3k2 k2 -
if p<dv3 then -
if 2p<dv3 then t[j] = LW(dv3-2p) - k2 - k2
else t[j] = LW(dv3-p) -
else t[j] LW(dv3)
dvi = t[O]*fO' k - k
mLW(dvi)*pO' k
dw2m*p k -
dv3 = HW(dwl)+HW(dv2)+1 - 2k
if p<dv3 then ml = LW(dv3-p) - k
else ml = LW(dv3)
for j0 to k-i do -
dvi = mi*f[j+l] k2 k2
mLW(dwl) * p0' k2 -
dv2m*p k2
dv3 = HW(dwl)+HW(dv2)+t[j+1]+i - 3k2 k2
if p<dv3 then -
if 2p<dv3 then t[j] = LW(dw3-2p) k2
else t[j] = LW(dv3-p) - -
else t[j] = LW(dw3) - -
for i0 to k-i do
cii] = t[i] - k k
returnc
6k2 + 3k8k2 + 3k4k2 + 3k2k2 + k6.5Incomplete Reduction in GF(p')
The method we are introducing in this section is an improvement over the Double
Montgomery multiplication method. We are reducing the complexity by eliminating
the reductions performed in the subfield, using the incomplete modular arithmetic
concept explained in the previous chapter. The coefficients of the polynomials are
allowed to be in the range of [1,2W-1]. The double-word numbers obtained from the
coefficient multiplications are allowed to grow as large as22W1. The incompletely
reduced representation avoids unnecessary reduction operations. If the number does
not exceed22W1, we do not perform a reduction. This check is simple to perform,
we are only checking to see if there is a carry-outfrom the double-word. We are
using the notation
(c, dw) = a *b3+ t (6.5)
to denote the word-level multiplication and accumulation operation whichmultiplies
the two one-word numbers a and63and accumulates the double-word t, producing
the outputs c anddw,such that c is the 1-bit carry-out anddw isthe double-word
result. If the carry-out is zero, the result is correct and we can further accumulate
on this number. If the carry out is 1, wefirst ignore the carry-out and then correct
the result. By ignoring the carry-out, we are essentially performing the operation
dw = dw22WSince we need to perform modulo p arithmetic, we are allowed
only add or subtract integer multiples of p, therefore, we need to correct the result
asdw = dw22W+CF, whereCFis called the correction factor and is defined as
CF22W1, (6.6)
where I is the largest possible integer which bringsCFto the range [l,p1]. The
numberCFis precomputed and saved. By performing the operationdw = dw
22\+CF, we essentially perform a modulo p reduction as
dw=dw_22WHCF=dw_22V+22\_Ip=dw_Ip. (6.7)
The result will be correct as a modular number. IfCFand the other numbers were
as large as22w1, there could be a possibility that adding theCFvalue would cause61
another carry-out requiring similar steps to correct the result for a second time. But
as we will explain later, the algorithm does not require asecond correction. At the
end of the algorithm, all of the double-word terms will be reduced to one-word term
using the Montgomery reduction method. These one-word terms will be left in the
range of [1,2W
The incomplete modular arithmetic method allows the coefficients to be as large
as 1. We do not need to reduce the results modulo p. We need to take care
of the carry-overs generated during the addition of coefficients in a similar way. The
polynomial multiplication in the extension field GF(p') is exactly the same as the
Double Montgomery multiplication method. The polynomials and their coefficients
need to be in the residue form requiring the terms r and R(x) having the same values
as in the previous algorithm. Using the same notations as before we aregiving the
word-level algorithm for the modified multiplication below.
WORD-LEVEL INCOMPLETE MONTGOMERY MULTIPLICATION ALGORITHM
Inputs:a(x) = (ak_iaiao), b(x) =(bk_i .
f(x)= (fk fib), p'0, f,and CF
Auxiliary.t = (tk. tito)
Output: c(x) =(Ck_i CiCO)
Stepi:fori=Otokldo
Step2: forj=Otokldo
Step3: (c,dw)=a1*bj+t
Step 4: ifc=1 then t=dw+CF
Step 5: elset3= dw
Step 6: m = LW( t0 ) * p
Step 7: dw=m*p
Step 8: (c,word)=HW(to )+HW(dw )+1
Step 9: if c = 1 then word = wordp
Step 10: dw = word *
Step 11: m=LW(dw)*p'0Step 12: dwl=m*p
Step 13: (c, word) = HW( dw ) + HW( dwl ) + 1
Step 14: if c = 1 then word := wordp
Stepl5:forj=Otokldo
Step 16: (c, dw) = word *+ t
Step 17: ifc=1 thent =dw+CF
Step 18: elset3= dw
Step 19: fori=Otokldo
Step 20: m = LW( t) * p
Step2l: dw=m*p
Step 22: (c, word)HW( tj ) + HW( dw ) + 1
Step 23: if c = 1 then word = wordp
Step 24: c3= word
Step 25: return c(x)
Similar to the previous one, this word-level algorithm has a large loop which scans
through the coefficients of one of the polynomials, two inner loops for the partial
multiplication, and the reduction operations. The final loop scans through the coef-
ficients of the result and reduces them to one-word numbers.
The first inner loop starts at Step 2 and finishes at Step 5.In Step 3 the
coefficient a, is multiplied with all other coefficients of polynomial b(x) through the
loop. The accumulated partial values are added to the result within this step. The
final result in dw can be larger than a double-word. We can demonstrate this as
follows:
a2*b3+ t(2w1) *(2W1) +22 1(22W+12W+1)>(22W1)
In the following two steps we are ignoring the carry if present which means subtract-
ing22Wfrom the result and adding CF. Thus, the result dw will now be less than
22Wsince
(2212W+1)22W+2W
122W 1 <22W63
This proves that no second carry will be produced by adding the correction factor
CF. At this point, we have a partial result that lies within a double-word array and
needs to be divided by x so that we can continue to accumulate the other partial
results without increasing the space requirements. Between Step6and Step14we
are reducing the last coefficient to a one-word number and using this number to
calculate the multiple of the generator polynomial that produces a zero in the last
term when added to the partial result.
The second inner loop starts at Step15and finishes at Step 18. In Step16the
word variable is multiplied with the coefficients of generator polynomial f(x). The
accumulated partial values are added to the result within this step. Similar to Step
3, the final result in dw can be larger than a double-word. The proof for Step 3
applies for Step16as well. Finally, the double-word representations are reduced to
one-word number within the loop that starts at step 19 and ends at Step24.
The Incomplete Double Montgomery multiplication method requires2k2 + 7k
multiplications,4k2 + 9kadditions,4k2 + 5kreads and2k2 + kwrites. Its steps and
operation counts are shown in Table6.2.Table 6.2. The operation counts for IDMM.
Mult Add Read Write
for i0 to k-i do -
for j0 to k-i do - -
(c,dv) = a[i]*b[j]+t[jJ k2 k2 2k2+k -
if c1 then t[j] = dv+CF k2 - k2
else t[j] = dw - -
m = LW(t[O])*pO' k - k -
dwm*p k -
(c,word)HW(t[O])+HW(dw)+1 2k k -
if c1 then word = word-p k
dv = word*fO' k
m = LW(dw)*pO' k - -
dwlm*p k - - -
(c,word) = HW(dw)+HW(dvi)+i - 2k - -
if c1 then word = word-p k
for j0 to k-i do - -
(c,dw) = word*f[j+i]+t[j+1] k2 k2 2k2 -
if c1 then t[j] = dv+CF k2 - k2
elset[j] =dw -
for i0 to k-i do - - - -
in = LW(t[j])*pO' k - k -
dwm*p k - -
(c,word) = HW(t[j])+HW(dw)+i 2k k -
if c1 then word = word-p k
c[j] = word - k
returnc - - - -
2k2 + 7k4k2 + 9k4k2 + 5k2k2 + k65
6.6Implementation Results
The Double Montgomery multiplication algorithm and its incomplete version have
been implemented on a 450-MHz Pentium II computer running the Windows 2000
operating system with 256 megabytes of memory. We also obtained timings on
the ARM SDK v2.50 platform for the 80-MHz ARM7TDMI microprocessor. The
codes were written in the assembly languages. The timings of the two methods for
two different platforms are tabulated in Table 6.3 in microseconds.In Table 6.3,
the acronyms DMM and IDMM stand for Double Montgomery Multiplication and
Incomplete Double Montgomery Multiplication, respectively.
The speedup in percentage is obtained by subtracting the incomplete timing
result from the complete timing result and then dividing it by the complete timing
result. As can be seen from Table 6.3, choosing a prime p close to the word boundary
and using smaller k values gives better results than using a prime p with less bit length
and largerkvalues when the overall bit length is fixed. The number of operations
to perform the multiplication depends on thekvalue.
For the ARM platform the incomplete multiplication version is 18-30 % faster
than the complete multiplication for overall bit lengths from 160 to 512. Similarly,
the Pentium platform has a speedup of 46-69 % for the same measurements. The
Pentium cash memory is an important factor in obtaining better speedup values than
the ARM platform.
The timing results for multiplication in OEFs obtained on a 233-Mhz Pen-
tium/MMX processor are given in [2]. According to those timing results, the Karatsuba-
variant multiplication code written in C for p = 2311 and f(x) = 7 executes in
4.6 microseconds. This corresponds to the operands of bit length 192. Our method
offers several choices for 192 bit operands, as emphasized in bold font in Table 6.3.
On a 450-MHz Pentium II, the fastest speed we obtain is 3.4 microseconds using
assembly language programming, where p is a 32-bit prime and k = 6. Furthermore,
for the same platform and the same values of p and f(x), we executed the IDMM
code (also written in C) and obtained 11.4 microseconds.Table 6.3. Timings of the DMM and IDMM in two different platforms in microsec-
onds.
Field ARM7TDMI (80 MHz)Pentium 11(450 MHz)
p kbitsDMM[IDMM% DMMIDMM%
8 bits20160339.8241.5 29 59.0 18.5 68
8 bits22176409.9289.7 29 71.4 21.7 69
8 bits24192486.0342.4 29 84.1 25.4 69
16 bits1016095.2 69.2 27 15.3 5.8 62
16 bits11176114.582.3 28 18.7 6.7 64
16 bits12192135.696.6 29 21.5 7.9 63
16 bits14224183.0128.6 30 29.2 10.1 65
16 bits16256237.9165.2 30 37.9 12.5 67
32 bits516026.7 21.9 18 4.4 2.3 47
32 bits619237.5 29.8 21 6.3 3.4 46
32 bits722450.3 38.9 22 8.4 4.3 48
32 bits825664.9 49.3 24 11.1 5.3 52
32 bits928881.5 60.9 25 13.5 7.2 46
32 bits1032099.8 73.7 26 16.5 8.6 47
32 bits13416166.6119.9 28 28.7 14.2 50
32 bits16512250.4177.3 29 42.2 17.8 58
While our method is slower in this particular case, it is more general (any p and
any f(x)), and offers several choices based for the platform (for example, an 8-bit
microcontroller versus a 32-bit general purpose processor). A general approach is
more valuable, and with the addition of some assembly language programming, it
can be made as fast as a special case method.67
6.7Comparing CF(p) and GF(pk) Arithmetic
Another issue is the comparison of GF(p) versus GF(pk) arithmetic. For the same
length operands, one could question the value of GF(pc) arithmetic. Why use GF(pc)
arithmetic if GF(p) arithmetic has similar or faster speed? We tried to find a partial
answer to this question by comparing the speed of the IDMM algorithm for
GF(pc)
and the 1MM (Incomplete Montgomery Multiplication) algorithm GF(q) such that
q is a prime of length approximately k times that of p, i.e., qp'. Note that since
GF(q) is a one-level field, the double Montgomery multiplication is not needed.
In Table 6.4, we compare the IDMM in GF(pc)with 1MM in GF(q). These codes
were also written in assembly. We expected thatGF(pc) arithmetic would be signif-
icantly slower than GF(q) arithmetic, however, we were surprised that the difference
is not that great. However, more comparisons for different types of algorithms and
platforms are needed in order to settle this issue.
Table 6.4. Timings of the 1MM code in GF(q) and the IDMM code in GF(pc)in
microseconds.
[
q p 1MM in GF(q)IDMM in GF(pk)
160 bits32 bits5 1.6 2.3
192 bits32 bits6 2.3 3.4
224 bits32 bits7 3.2 4.3
256 bits32 bits8 3.9 5.3
288 bits32 bits9 4.6 7.2
320 bits32 bits10 5.3 8.6
416 bits32 bits13 8.3 14.2
512 bits32 bits16 12.3 17.86.8Conclusions and Further Research
In this research, we are proposing two general purpose multiplication methods for
the field ofGF(p').We use the Montgomery multiplication [18] and the incomplete
reduction methods to build our new algorithms. Despite the higher complexity of
the arithmetic inGF(p')compared toGF(p),the timing results show that the new
multiplication method inGF(pc)is almost as fast as multiplication inGF(p)for
fixed bit lengths. We believe this method will be useful for creating fast implementa-
tions of cryptographic functions based onGF(p')for arbitrary primes and arbitrary
generating polynomials. The general approach is more robust from the security point
of view since it does not depend on particular instances of the Galois field and does
not restrict the field parameters in any way.
We are currently investigating other methods for multiplication inGF(pv).Fur-
ther research is also needed to design efficient modular inversion methods which can
work together with the proposed multiplication algorithms inGF(p')for efficient
software implementations of elliptic curve cryptographic functions.CHAPTER 7
MODULAR INVERSION INGF(pk)
7.1Introduction
The modular inversion operation plays an important role in public key cryptography,
particularly, in computing point operations on an elliptic curve defined over the finite
fieldGF(p)or the finite extension fieldGF(pk) [15, 24].
Although it is not as performance critical as modular multiplication, inversion is
the most costly arithmetic operation in EC systems. Therefore, most of the practical
implementations try to avoid the use of inversion as much as possible.But it is
not possible to avoid it completely. An example for this is the use of projective
coordinates instead of the affine coordinates which are explained in Chapter3.
InGF(p)modular inversion can be calculated with the binary extended euclidean
algorithm[23]or more efficiently with the montgomery inverse algorithm[14, 30].In
GF(2k)the Itoh-Tsujii algorithm[13]and its variants or the almost inverse algorithm
[32]can be used.
In GF(pIc), Bailey and Paar [2] proposed an inversion based on the Itoh-Tsujii
inversion for the specific case in which f(x) is a binomial. Lee et.al.[20]uses the
extended euclidean and the almost inverse algorithms for inversion. Lim and Hwang
[22]are introducing two different versions of the extended euclidean algorithm.70
7.2Inversion Algorithms
7.2.1OEF Inversion
For any nonzero elementA(x) EGF(pc), there existsB(x)and U(x)EGF(pk) such
thatA(x)B(x) + U(x)f(x) = 1,whereB(x)is the inverse ofA(x)in GF(p'). Here,
f(x) isthe generator polynomial which is monic and irreducible.
Bailey and Paar proposed an inversion method in the Optimal Extension Field
(OEF) via a modification of the Itoh-Tsujii algorithm [2].As it is shown in [2]
the problem of extension field inversion is reduced to a subfield inversion using the
fact that for any element c e GF(p'),
pk_1)/(p_1)E GF(p) [21]. The algorithm
computes an inverse in GF(pc) as
A(x)' = (A(x)r)_1A(x)r_l mod f(x) (7.1)
wherer(k_i)/(_1)pk_l+pk_2+...+p+l.The algorithmbelowdescribes
the procedure to compute the inverse. The subfield elements are written in lower
case letters.
Algorithm 1: Optimal Extension Field Inversion
Input:A(x)E GF(pc).
Output:B(x)= so thatA(x)B(x) = 1mod f(x).
Step 1.B(x) = A(x)
Step 2. Use an addition chain to computeB(x) = B(x)r_l
Step 3.c0 = B(x)A(x)
Step 4. c =c1
Step 5. B(x)=B(x)c
Step 6. Output B(x)
To evaluate the equation (7.1), an efficient method to evaluateA(x)r_lis re-
quired. For a given field the exponent r 1 will be fixed. Analogous to the Itoh-Tsujii71
inversion, an addition chain is used for exponentiation. To construct this chain the
frobenius map plays an important role in raising a field element to the p-th power.
The calculations for this operation are easy when f(x) is a binomial. For the rest
of the calculations we need multiplications and a subfield inversion which can be
calculated using the extended euclidean algorithm. The general expression for the
complexity of this algorithm in terms of subfield multiplication is given as;
#SM = [log2(k1)] + H(k1)](k1) + [log2(k1)]
+H(k-1)-1](k2+k-1)+2k
7.2.2Extended Euclidian Algorithms
In [22] the inverse B(x) is computed with the extended euclidean algorithms given
below. These are general algorithms not depending on special values. We denote
deg() as the degree of a polynomial. F(x)2and G(x) are coefficients of the ith degree
of the polynomial F(x) or G(x), respectively.
Algorithm 2: Exended Eulidean Algorithm
Input: A(x) E GF(pc) and f(x).
Output: B(x) = so that A(x)B(x)1 mod f(x).
Step 1. Set B(x) = 0, C(x) = 1, F(x) = f(x) and G(x) = A(x).
Step 2. While deg(F(x))0
Step 3.If deg(F(x)) <deg(G(x)), then exchange F(x),B(x)
with G(x),C(x), respectively
Step 4.Update F(x) and B(x) as follows (j = deg(F(x))deg(G(x)))
a =F(X)deg(F(x))G(X)g(G(x)),F(X)= F(x)ax3G(x)
B(x) = B(x)axC(x)
Step 5. Output B(x) = F(x)1B(x)72
The algorithm above reduces the degree of the larger of F(x) and G(x) by at
least one in each iteration of Step 2. Therefore, at most 2k2 iterations are needed
in Step 2. The most time-consuming operation is the subfield inversion in Step 4. In
[22] an improved algorithm that uses less subfield inversions is given as follows.
Algorithm 3: Improved Exended Eulidean Algorithm
Input:A(x) EGF(pk) andf(x).
Output:B(x) = sothatA(x)B(x) = 1modf(x).
Step 1. SetB(x) = 0, C(x) = 1,F(x) =f(x)and G(x) =A(x).
Step 2. While deg(F(x))0
Step 3.If deg(F(x)) < deg(G(x)), then exchange F(x),B(x)
with G(x),C(x), respectively
Step 4.Update F(x) andB(x)as follows (j = deg(F(x))deg(G(x)))
a =
F(X)deg(F(x))G(X)g(G(x)),
=(F(X)deg(F(x))_1
F(x) = F(x)(ax + xi')G(x)
B(x) = B(x)(ax3 +i3x')C(x)
Step 5.If deg(F(x)) = deg(G(x)), then execute the following
a = F(x)deg(F(x))G(x)(G(X)),F(x) = F(x)aG(x)
B(x) = B(x)aC(x)
Step 6. OutputB(x)=F(x)1B(x)
In the improved extended euclidean algorithm each iteration of Step 2 reduces
the degree of F(x) by at least two by subtracting a suitable multiple of G(x).The
numbers of subfield inversions and modular reductions are reduced by half compared
to the extended euclidean algorithm.
The subfield inversion becomes more expensive when the size of p increases. We
still need to minimize the number of subfield inversions. The extended euclidean
algorithm (Algorithm 2) maintains the following equations throughout its internal
processing.73
A(x)B(x) + U(x)f(x) = F(x), A(x)C(x) + V(x)f(x) = G(x) (7.2)
for some polynomials U(x) and V(x) (not interesting to us). Therefore we can
see that these equations will hold if we multiply both F(x) and B(x) orG(x) and
C(x) with the same constant. The following algorithm works because of this fact.
Algorithm 4: EE Algorithm using multiplication
Input: A(x) E GF(pk) and1(x).
Output: B(x) = so that A(x)B(x) = 1 mod f(x).
Step 1. Set B(x) = O,C(x) = l,F(x) = f(x) and G(x) = A(x).
Step 2. While deg(F(x))0
Step 3. If deg(F(x)) < deg(G(x)), then exchange F(x),B(x)
with G(x),C(x), respectively
Step 4.Update F(x) and B(x) as follows (j = deg(F(x))deg(G(x)))
=G(X)eg(G(x)) 8= (F(X)deg(F(x))G(X)deg(G(x))),
= G(x)deg(G(x))F(x)deg(F(x))_1 F(X)deg(F(x))G(X)deg(G(x))_1
F(x) = aF(x) + 'yxi')G(x)
B(x) =aB(x)(1flx+7x')C(x)
Step 5. If deg(F(x)) = deg(G(x)), then execute the following
F(x) = G(x)deg(G(x))F(x)F(x)deg(F(xG(x)
B(x) = G(x)deg(G(x))B(x)F(x)deg(p(x))C(x)
Step 6. Output B(x) = F(x)'B(x)
Algorithm 4.requires just one subfield inversion at the final step and has lower
complexity than Bailey and Paar's OEF inversion. Table (7.1) summarizes the com-
plexity of the three algorithms in this section. Further details can be found in [22].74
Table 7.1. Complexity for inverse algorithms.
Algorithm##multiplication#reductions#inversions
Algorithm 2 2k2 +k4 2k2 +k4 2k 1
Algorithm 3 2k2 +k4 k2k2 k+1
Algorithm 4 3k25 k2 +4k6 1
7.2.3Almost Inverse Algorithms
In [20] the following algorithm is called the almost inverse algorithm. It finds B(x)
and an integer e satisfying B(x)A(x)+U(x)f(x)= Xe.We denote deg() as the degree
of a polynomial. F(x) andG(x)2are coefficients of the ith degree of the polynomial
F(x) or G(x), respectively.
Algorithm 5: Almost Inverse Algorithm
Input: A(x) E GF(pk) and1(x).
Output: B(x) = so that A(x)B(x)= Xemod f(x).
Step 1. Set e = 0, B(x) = 0, C(x) = 1, F(x) = f(x) and G(x) = A(x).
Step 2. While F(x) contains factor x
Step 3.F(x) = F(x)/x,C(x) = C(x)x,e = e+ 1
Step 4. If deg(F(x)) = 0, then return B(x) = F'B(x), e
Step 5. If deg(F(x)) <deg(G(x)), then exchange F(x),B(x)
with G(x),C(x), respectively
Step 6. a = F(x)o/G(x)o
Step 7. F(x) = F(x) + aG(x), B(x) = B(x) + aC(x)
Step 8. goto Step 2.
In [20] an improved version that reduces the number of iterations is given as
follows.75
Algorithm 6: Modified Almost Inverse Algorithm
Input: A(x)eGF(pk) and f(x).
Output: B(x) = so that A(x)B(x)= Xemod f(x).
Step 1. Set e = 0,B(x) = 0,C(x)1,F(x) = f(x) and G(x) = A(x).
Step 2. While F(x) contains factor x
Step 3.F(x)F(x)/x, C(x) = C(x)x, e = e + 1
Step 4. If deg(F(x)) = 0, then return B(x) = F1B(x),e
Step 5. If deg(F(x)) < deg(G(x)), then exchange F(x),B(x)
with G(x),C(x), respectively
Step 6. j = deg(F(x))deg(G(x)),fi= F(x)o/G(x)o
Step 7. If (j0) then a =F(X)deg(F(x))/G(X)deg(G(x)),else a = 0
Step 8. F(x) = F(x) + (ax + 3)G(x), B(x) = B(x) + (ax + 3)C(x)
Step 9. goto Step 2.
The modified almost inverse algorithm gives better performance that the ex-
tended euclidean algorithm (Algorithm 2) which was explained in the previous sec-
tion. Further details can be found in [20]. In Algorithm 6, we know that 0 < e <2k
and the result is B(x)xwhere B(x) =A(x)_lxe.
The classical modular inverse can be defined as A(x)' mod f(x) and the mont-
gomery inverse as A(x)1x" mod1(x)[30] where R =is known as the residue
(Chapter 6). We can further calculate the classical inverse or the montgomery inverse
with similar methods in [30] for GF(pc) using the Double Montgomery Multiplica-
tion (DMM) or the Incomplete Double Montgomery Multiplication (IDMM). For the
montgomery inverse we can calculate the following.
S(x) = DMM(B(x)x2ke)=A(X)_lXeX2k_eX_k=A(x)_lxcmod f(x).(7.3)
For the classical inverse we can calculate
DMM(S(x), 1) = A(x)_lx!d1x=A(x)1mod f(x). (7.4)76
7.3Conclusion
We explained six different inversion algorithms in this Chapter. We can conclude
that the best algorithm to calculate the inverse in GF(pc) is Algorithm 4., having
even a lower complexity than the OEF inversion. The almost inverse algorithm can
also be very useful if residue arithmetic is in use.77
CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS
This thesis describes new methods for finite field arithmetic and explains their use
in Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems.
The incomplete modulararithmeticconcept is applied to finite field arithmetic
overGF(p)andGF(pc).The results are demonstrating the effectiveness and practi-
cality of the method. We introduced new modular addition and modular subtraction
algorithms and implemented a new Montgomery variant modular multiplication a!-
gorithm inGF(p).The incomplete modular arithmetic concept provides up to 13 %
speedup in the execution of the ECDSA algorithm over the fieldGF(p)for the bit
length l of p in the range 1611<256.
We introduced two new modular multiplication algorithms based on the Mont-
gomery multiplication method inGF(pc).The use of the incomplete modular arith-
metic concept is crucial to perform an efficient modular multiplication algorithm in
GF(pk).We are proposing to implement the finite field arithmetic without limiting
the prime characteristic p and the generator polynomial and still obtain comparable
timing results to the arithmetic implemented inGF(p).
In Chapter 7, we explained various inversion algorithms forG(p'),most of them
general purpose algorithms, that can be used with our multiplication algorithms.
We realized that the modified extended eulidean algorithms were very efficient to
perform the inversion operation.
Further research can be conducted in finding better general purpose multiplica-
tion and inversion algorithms for CF(pc).rL
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